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LOVE IN THE OFFICE: A GUIDE FOR DEALING
WITH SEXUAL HARASSMENT UNDER TITLE VII
OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
Marvin F. Hill, Jr. *
Curtiss K. Behrens**
One of the most volatile and legally perplexing situations facing the labor
practitioner is that of sexual harassment of employees. While the exact extent
of sexual harassment is unknown, it has been estimated that between fifty
and eighty percent of all women' in the workforce have been subjected to
some form of sexual harassment. 2 One of the problems for the practitioner is
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1. While in theory anyone can be a harasser and anyone can be a victim of sexual
harassment, virtually all reported decisions and studies concerning the issue involve a male who
is accused of sexually harassing a female. It should be stressed, however, that men who have been
subjected to sexual harassment may obtain relief under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
§§ 701-718, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). As stated by the district
court in Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), vacated, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir.
1979):
It is also notable that since the statute prohibits discrimination against men as well as
women, a finding of discrimination could be made where a female supervisor
imposed the criteria of the instant case [retaliation because of a refusal to engage in
sexual acts] upon only the male employees in her office. So could a finding of
discrimination be made if the supervisor were a homosexual.
413 F. Supp. at 659 n.6. It has been reported that in Bonn, West Germany, a female private in
the United States Army was convicted for indecently assaulting a male soldier. She was fined
$298 and sentenced to thirty days of hard labor. See D. NEUCARTEN & J. SHAFRITZ, SEXUALITY IN
ORGANIZATIONS 13 n.26 (1980) [hereinafter cited as NEUCARTEN & SHAFITZ].
2. Perhaps the most comprehensive review of recent surveys that attempt to ascertain the
extent to which individuals have been subjected to acts of sexual harassment has been undertaken
by Neugarten and Shafritz. Noting that the methodological approaches leave much to be desired,
but are nevertheless valuable for illustrating the dimensions of the problem, the authors report
the following results obtained from recent studies:
1) In May, 1975, the Working Women's Institute of New York, a research and
advocacy center devoted to furthering the goals of equal employment opportunity
for women, surveyed 155 women on the subject. Seventy percent reported that they
had experienced sexual harassment at least once. Of these, the majority ignored it,
only to find that the behavior continued or worsened. Of those who ignored it, some
were penalized by unwarranted reprimands, sabotage of their work, transfers or
dismissals. Only a minority of those harassed complained through established chan-
nels; and of these complaints, no action was taken in over half the cases. The women
who did not complain said it was because nothing would be done, or their com-
plaints would be ridiculed, or they would be blamed. For the women who experi-
enced it, sexual harassment had negative emotional effects, with the large majority
feeling angry or upset, and some feeling frightened or guilty. Some felt powerless,
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ascertaining a working definition of what constitutes sexual harassment un-
der Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.3 A supervisor who conditions
diminished in their ambition, and impaired in their job performance. Working
Women's Institute, Sexual Harassment on the Job: Results of Preliminary Survey
(1975).
2) Also in 1976, the United Nations Ad Hoc Group on Equal Rights for Women
polled all 875 women employed by the U.N. in professional and clerical positions.
Half of the respondents indicated that sexual pressure currently existed on their jobs,
yet less than one-third had complained. The reason most frequently cited for not
complaining was the perceived absence of proper channels for lodging a complaint.
United Nations Ad Hoc Group on Equal Rights for Women, Report on the Question-
naire xxxvi, noted in Comment, Employment Discrimination-Female Employees'
Claim Alleging Verbal and Physical Advances by a Male Supervisor Dismissed as
Nonactionable-Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 148, 149 n.6
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Come Comment].
3) In 1977, sociologist Sandra Harley Carey interviewed 401 working women on the
topic of sexual politics in business. All these women, interestingly enough, reported
experiencing sexual harassment, but only a minority felt embarrassed or intimidated
or thought the behavior demeaning. Over 20% indicated that they would not report
an incident of sexual harassment because their superiors would take no action. Over
one-third of the women did not even know if their company had a policy against
harassment. S. Carey, Sexual Politics in Business (1976) (unpublished paper, Univer-
sity of Texas at San Antonio).
4) In 1978-79, a small sample of 198 federal employees in the Departments of
Health, Education and Welfare and Justice, and in the General Services Administra-
tion were interviewed by New Responses, Inc., a nonprofit organization of women's
policy consultants based in Washington, D.C. Of the 79 women in the sample who
reported experiencing sexual harassment, one-fourth had had promotions withheld,
some were transferred, and a few were fired or were looking for another job. The
majority of the respondents indicated that they experienced sexual harassment on a
continual basis and reported feelings of anger, helplessness and physical illness which
interfered with their performance. A few indicated that sexual harassment took the
form of rape or attempted rape. Sexual Harassment in the Federal Government:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Investigations of the House Comm. on Post Office
and Civil Service, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 39-40 (1979) (statement of Mary Ann
Largen, Director, New Responses, Inc.).
See NEUGARTEN & SHAFRITZ, supra note 1, at 4-6.
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The National Organization for
Women has defined sexual harassment as "any repeated or unwarranted verbal or physical
sexual advance, sexually explicit derogatory statement, or sexually discriminatory remark made
by someone in the workplace, which is offensive or objectionable to the recipient of [sic] which
causes the recipient discomfort or humiliation or which interferes with the recipient's job
performance." Approaches to Affirmative Action: Sexual Harassment, [1979-1980 Transfer
Binder] 8 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 443:306.
One author defines sexual harassment as "a sexual advance made with an explicit or implicit
threat of adverse job consequences for a failure to comply or as one adversely affecting a
condition of employment." Note, Sexual Harassment and Title VII: The Foundation for the
Elimination of Sexual Cooperation as an Employment Condition, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1007, 1007
n.2 (1978).
Another commentator notes:
The term "sexual harassment" indicates verbal and physical advances of a sexual
nature, including propositions of sexual relations. It is to be distinguished from
harassment or intimidation based on sex, i.e.,that which has no sexual aspect al-
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an employment benefit on sexual favors from a subordinate is clearly engag-
ing in conduct proscribed by the statute. It is not at all certain, however,
whether the statute is violated when a nonsupervisory employee requests a
sexual favor from a colleague. Although the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) has recently issued guidelines on sexual harassment,
many issues are still unresolved.
The purpose of this Article is to examine the problem of sexual harassment
at the workplace. Reference is made to Title VII as a potential remedy for an
employee who has been the victim of sexual harassment. After a discussion of
early case law, sexual harassment is examined under recent court decisions
and the EEOC's newly promulgated guidelines. A suggested format for
addressing the problem of sexual harassment under civil rights legislation is
offered as a guide for avoiding liability under the statute.
TITLE VII OF THE CIvIL RIGHTs ACT OF 1964
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, explicitly prohibits
discrimination in employment, including hiring, firing, compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. 4 Since 1972, the Act has applied to employ-
ers engaged in an industry affecting commerce who have fifteen or more
employees each working day who are employed during twenty or more
calendar weeks of the current calendar year.5 It also applies to employment
agencies procuring employees for such an employer 6 and to almost all labor
organizations. 7 The 1972 amendments also extend coverage to all state and
local governments, government agencies, political subdivisions, excluding
elected officials, their personal assistants and immediate advisors, and the
District of Columbia departments and agencies, except where subject by law
to the federal competitive service.'
though it is directed solely against one sex. The latter activity has been found to
violate Title VII.
Corne Comment, supra note 2, at 148-49 n.4.
4. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, §§ 701-718, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 &
Supp. III 1979). Section 703(a) of Title VII provides in part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual . . . because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees . . . in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual *f employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
5. Id. § 2000e(b).
6. Id. § 2000e(b), (c).
7. Id. § 2000e(c), (d).
8. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2, 86 Stat. 103
(amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a)). As originally enacted in 1964, Title VII's coverage was not
extended to employees of the federal government. In 1972, however, the statute was amended to
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Any person claiming to be aggrieved under the statute may file a com-
plaint with the EEOC. The EEOC is vested with the authority to investigate
individual charges of discrimination, to promote voluntary compliance with
the statute, and to institute civil actions against parties named in a discrimi-
nation charge.9  The EEOC cannot adjudicate claims or impose administra-
tive sanctions; rather, it prosecutes violations in the federal courts which are
authorized to issue injunctive relief and to order such affirmative action as
may be appropriate.10
To effectuate the purposes and policies of the statute, 1 Congress included
section 704(a),' 12 which essentially prohibits employers from retaliating
against employees who initiate complaints under Title VII.13 This section
has been held to afford protection even though the conditions and conduct
complained of do not constitute a violation of Title VII.14 Moreover, even
include most federal employees. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-
261, § 11, 86 Stat. 111 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (f)(1) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
10. Id. § 2000e-5(f), (g).
11. As expressed in the EEOC Regulations and Guidelines:
Congress enacted Title VII in order to improve the economic and social conditions of
minorities and women by providing equality of opportunity in the work place. These
conditions were part of a larger pattern of restriction, exclusion, discrimination,
segregation, and inferior treatment of minorities and women in many areas of life.
29 C.F.R. § 1608.1(b) (1981).
12. Section 704(a) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against
any of his employees or applicants for employment, for an employment agency, or
joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or
retraining, including on-the-job training programs, to discriminate against any
individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against any member thereof or
applicant for membership, because he has opposed any practice, made an unlawful
employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing
under this subchapter.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1976). See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998 (5th
Cir. 1969). As the Pettway court noted, "the Act will be frustrated if the employer may
unilaterally determine the truth or falsity of charges and take independent action." Id. at 1005.
See also East v. Romine, Inc., 518 F.2d 332 (5th Cir. 1975); Johnson v. Lillie Rubin Affiliates,
Inc., 5 Empl. Prac. Dec. 8542 (M.D. Tenn. 1973).
13. "Employee" is defined by Title VII as "an individual employed by an employer." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1976). The statute has been held to prohibit discrimination relating to or
arising out of an employment relationship, whether or not the person discriminated against is an
employee at the time of the discriminatory conduct. See, e.g., Pantchenko v. C.B. Dolge Co.,
581 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1978) (claim allowed against former employer for discriminatorily
refusing to furnish recommendation letter to plaintiff's prospective employer despite absence of
employment relationship at time of refusal).
14. See Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1978), cert.
granted, 439 U.S. 1066, vacated, 442 U.S. 366 (1979). The Third Circuit held in Novotny:
We recognize that to construe § 704(a) as protecting "opposition" beyond that
embodied in participation in Title VII proceedings carries with it the prospect of a
greater burden of litigation for employers .... Indeed, it may present the danger of
harassment by employees who suffer some imagined slight based on a chance re-
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relatives of persons who exercise rights under the statute are protected from
employer retaliation.'"
Discrimination based on religion, sex or national origin is regulated under
Title VII by a different statutory standard than that applied to race or color.
The former types of employment discrimination are tolerated when religion,
sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ)
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of a particular business.'
Accordingly, the statute mandates a two-step analysis in these employment
discrimination cases. First, the court must find that the employer has en-
gaged in discrimination under one of the prohibited classifications. After the
court makes a determination that a prohibited form of discrimination has
occurred, the employer has the opportunity to demonstrate that the discrimi-
nation was justified as a BFOQ under the second step.
SEXUAL HARASSMENT AS DISCRIMINATION
"ON ACCOUNT OF SEX" UNDER TITLE VII:
EARLY CASE LAW AND THE SEARCH
FOR A THEORY
To better comprehend the current status of the law and the problems
inherent in asserting a successful claim under the statute, a review of early
federal court decisions is instructive. Many of the early decisions by the
federal district courts were adverse to complaining employees. 17 Some
mark. Yet these dangers are implicit in any decision to recognize legal rights; to
decrease the pressure of litigation on employers by the simple expedient of refusing to
protect employees is always an option. Congress, however, has passed legislation
extending the shield of Title VII to "opposition," and the possibility of abuse by
litigious plantiffs cannot justify withdrawal of the bulwark.
584 F.2d at 1261.
15. E.g., Kornbluh v. Stearns & Foster Co., 73 F.R.D. 307 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (husband
brought § 704(a) claim against his former employer because of his sudden dismissal during the
course of his wife's Title VII suit for sex discrimination against that company).
16. Section 703(e) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision [of this subchapter], (1) it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees, for
an employment agency to classify, or refer for employment any individual, for a
labor organization to classify its membership or to classify or refer for employment
any individual, or for an employer, labor organization, or joint labor-management
committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining programs to
admit or employ any individual in any such program, on the basis of his religion,
sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national
origin is a bona fide occupational qualification [BFOQ] reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976).
It is noteworthy that section 703(e) does not permit a BFOQ exception with respect to "race,"
which, according to the legislative history of Title VII, was excluded intentionally. See U.S.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLE VII AND TITLE
XI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS Acr OF 1964, 3183-85, 3191-92 (1968).
17. E.g., Garber v. Saxon Indus., Inc., 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. 7586 (E.D. Va. 1976)
(employee's allegation that she was fired for refusing to engage in sexual relations with her
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courts were of the opinion that Title VII is simply not applicable to claims of
sexual harassment. 8 Other decisions indicated that only in certain situa-
tions would a cause of action lie under the statute. 19 While many of the
early federal court cases that refused to recognize Title VII claims based on
sexual harassment were later overturned on appeal, most of the decisions
concerned three major issues: (1) the conditions under which a sexual harass-
ment claim is cognizable under Title VII's proscriptions against gender
discrimination; (2) when, if ever, the conduct of an employee, usually a
supervisor, can be attributed to the employer; and (3) the effect upon the
employee-employer relationship, as well as on the court system, if the plain-
tiff is allowed to assert a harassment claim under the statute. A closer
analysis of the early opinions reveals some of the background conditions that
prompted the EEOC to formulate its Guidelines on Sexual Harassment.
The first case to reach the federal courts was Barnes v. Train,20 decided in
1974. Granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the District
Court for the District of Columbia stated that retaliatory action taken
against a female employee for her refusal to have an after hours affair with a
supervisor was not the type of discriminatory conduct contemplated by Title
VII. 2' The acts that the plaintiff complained of, the court reasoned, were
taken not because she was a woman, but because she refused to engage in a
sexual affair with her supervisor. 22  The court explained that this was a
controversy "underpinned by the subtleties of an inharmonious personal
relationship based on plaintiff's sex.
'23
Similarly, in Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc.,2 4 decided one year after
Barnes, the District Court of Arizona held that unwelcome verbal and
physical sexual advances by a male supervisor to two female employees,
supervisor not actionable under Title VII), rev'd sub nom. Garber v. Saxon Bus. Prod., Inc., 552
F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977). See also notes 20-30 & 34-38 and accompanying text infra.
18. See notes 20-30 & 39-43 and accompanying text infra.
19. Stringer v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Community Affairs, 446 F. Supp. 704 (M.D. Pa. 1978)
(female employee who alleged she was subject to unjustified criticism, harassment, and eventual
discharge because she refused sexual advances did state claim under Title VII); Neeley v.
American Fidelity Assurance Co., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 482 (N.D. Okla. 1978) (Title VII
violated where it is clear that continued employment and benefits are conditioned upon plain-
tiffs acquiescence to advances of superior); Rinkel v. Associated Pipeline Contractors, 17 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 224 (D. Alaska 1978) (allegation that employer refused to hire plaintiff because
she would not submit to sexual advances of senior management official states valid claim for
relief under Title VII); Smith v. Rust Eng'r Co., 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1172 (N.D. Ala. 1978)
(allegation of sexual advances and remarks made a condition of employment is sufficient to state
a claim under Title VII); Price v. John F. Lawhon Furniture Co., 16 Empl. Prac. Dec. 8342
(N.D. Ala. 1978) (summary judgment granted for defendant employer absent evidence that
employer knew about discriminatory conduct and either authorized or acquiesced to it).
20. 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 123 (D.D.C. 1974), rev'd sub nom. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d
983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
21. 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 124.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir.
1977).
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which caused the employees to terminate their employment, created no
cause of action under Title VII. The court stated that nothing in the com-
plaint alleged, nor could be construed to allege, that the conduct complained
of was a company-directed policy that deprived women of employment
opportunities. 25 The court further reasoned that there is nothing in Title
VII which could be construed reasonably to apply to " 'verbal and physical
sexual advances' by another employee, even though that individual was in a
supervisory capacity, where such complained of acts or conduct had no
relationship to the nature of the employment. ' 2  The alleged sexual ad-
vances, noted the court, "appeared to be nothing more than a personal
proclivity, peculiarity or mannerism" on the part of the supervisor.2 7 The
court stated that it would be ludicrous to hold that sexual harassment of a
female by a male was the type of activity contemplated by Title VII.2 8 To
do so would mean that if the conduct complained of was directed equally to
males there would be no basis for a lawsuit. Moreover, every time an
employee made sexually oriented advances toward another employee a fed-
eral lawsuit could result. The court concluded that the only sure way an
employer could avoid such charges would be to have employees who were
asexual. 29 Although ruling against the plaintiff, the court in Corne did not
clarify whether sexual harassment that is attributable to the employer, as
opposed to a mere supervisory employee, is cognizable under Title VII. 3°
Two 1976 decisions addressed the question of whether sexual harassment
attributable to an employer could constitute discrimination on account of
gender under Title VII. In Williams v. Saxbe 3' the District Court for the
District of Columbia denied the defendant's motion to dismiss and held that
retaliatory actions taken because a female employee declined her supervisor's
sexual advances could constitute gender discrimination under Title VII. The
Williams court made it clear that an allegation of the existence of a policy or
practice imposed on women similarly situated such that the conduct com-
plained of was not a mere "isolated personal incident" was essential to the
cause of action. 32 Accepting the veracity of the plaintiff's claim, the court
25. 390 F. Supp. at 163.
26. Id.
27. id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 163-64.
30. Cf. Munford v. James T. Barnes & Co., 441 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (employer
may be held liable under Title VII for sexually harassing conduct of supervisory employees if
employer knew of activities and failed to investigate). See also notes 44-48 and accompanying
text infra.
31. 413 F. Supp. 654, 657 (D.D.C. 1976), vacated on other grounds, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C.
Cir. 1979).
32. 413 F. Supp. at 660 n.8. In the words of the court:
Whether this case presents a policy or practice of imposing a condition of sexual
submission on the female employees .. .or whether this was a non-employment
related personal encounter requires a factual determination. It is sufficient for
purposes of this motion to dismiss that the plaintiff has alleged it was the former in
this case.
Id. at 660.
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declared that the conduct of the supervisor "created an artificial barrier to
employment which was placed before one gender and not the other, despite
the fact that both genders were [otherwise] similarly situated." 3
As in Williams, the District Court for the Northern District of California
stated, in Miller v. Bank of America,34 that there could be situations where a
cause of action would arise under Title VII for "an employer's active, or
tacit, approval of a personnel policy requiring sexual favors as a condition of
employment. ' 35 The Miller court, however, dismissed a female employee's
complaint that alleged her employer promised her a better job if she would
be sexually cooperative and thereafter caused her discharge when she
refused. Because the attraction between males and females is a natural
phenomenon playing at least a subtle part in most personnel decisions, the
court reasoned that it would be unwise for courts to delve into these matters
without clear evidence of consistent gender-based discrimination, as opposed
to an isolated act; otherwise every flirtation of the smallest order could give
rise to liability. 31
A relevant factor in the Miller decision was the court's resolution of the
plaintiff's argument that the acts of her supervisor should be imputed to the
employer. The court acknowledged that it had not been clearly established
whether an employer can be held liable for isolated acts of discriminatory
misconduct on the part of its lower echelon employees, but ruled that when a
company-wide policy expressly condemns the alleged misconduct, and when
an internal grievance mechanism exists for resolving complaints of this sort, a
failure on the part of the employee to avail him or herself of these internal
procedures would render tenuous a finding of employer culpability. 37 Fol-
lowing this line of reasoning, the court held that since plaintiff failed to bring
the matter to the attention of her employer in order that it might investigate
the incident, she could not claim that the employer tacitly approved the
actions of her supervisor. 38
Clearly Miller, as did Corne, rejected the ruling in Williams that conduct
resulting in an impediment to the employment of one gender and not another
may be cognizable under the statute. Instead, the Miller court appeared to
find a violation only when plaintiff could demonstrate that a policy or
practice existed at the organizational level. While this criterion would ensure
that claims involving mere flirtations would not be litigated at the district
court level, a heavy burden is placed on an employee who is the object of
sexual harassment.
Of special note is Tomkins v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 3 in which
the District Court of New Jersey rejected the Williams reasoning and held
33. Id. at 657-58.
34. 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979).
35. 418 F. Supp. at 236.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 236 n.2.
38. Id. at 235-36.
39. 422 F. Supp. 553, 556 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
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that Title VII could not be used to remedy sexual harassment. The court
stated that the statute was enacted to remove those artificial barriers to
employment that are the result of unjust and long encrusted prejudice, such
as race or gender. 40
Title VII, according to the Tomkins court, was not drafted to afford a
federal tort remedy "for what amounts to a physical attack motivated by
sexual desire on the part of a supervisor and which happened to occur in a
corporate corridor rather than a back alley." ' While in the present instance
the supervisor was male and the employee female the court noted that the
gender of the parties could have been reversed, or the parties could have
been of the same gender. Thus, since the gender of each was only incidental
to the claim of abuse, the plaintiff's claim of sexual harassment was not
within the scope of the statute. 42
Finally, the court noted that if a sexual advance made by a supervisor to a
subordinate was actionable under Title VII, no supervisor could prudently
enter into a social dialogue with any subordinate of either sex. In the words
of the court:
An invitation to dinner could become an invitation to a federal lawsuit if a
once harmonious relationship turned sour at some later time. And if an
inebriated approach by a supervisor to a subordinate at the office Christ-
mas party could form the basis of a federal lawsuit for sex discrimination if
a promotion or a raise is later denied to a subordinate, we would need
4,000 federal trial judges instead of some 400.43
During this period of the development of the substantive law, the District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held, in Munford v. James T.
Barnes & Co., 44 that a former employee who alleged that she was discharged
for refusing the sexual advances of a male supervisor did state a cause of
action under the statute. More importantly from the standpoint of develop-
ing a theory of liability for the acts of supervisors-a recurring problem in
obtaining relief for acts of sexual harassment-the court issued guidelines for
determining what constitutes an employment practice of sexual harassment
for which an employer may be held liable. The court pointed out that under
the statute an employer is defined as a person engaged in an industry affect-
ing commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day who
are employed for twenty or more calendar weeks of the current calendar
year, and any agent of such person. 45 Since both the supervisor who alleg-
edly made the advances and the supervisor's superior who agreed to the
discharge were responsible for making personnel decisions for James T.
40. 422 F. Supp. at 556.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 557.
44. 441 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
45. Id. at 466 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976)).
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Barnes & Co., the court concluded that both would be considered agents of
the company under the statute. 46
It is especially noteworthy that the Barnes court refused to hold that an
employer is automatically vicariously liable for all acts of its agents-a
position that is arguably at odds with the EEOC's current guidelines. 47 The
court did stress, however, that an employer has an affirmative duty to make
appropriate investigations of complaints of sexual harassment and to deal
appropriately with the offending personnel. 48
In a case similar to Munford, the District Court of Colorado held, in
Heelan v. Johns-Manville Corp. ,* that sexual harassment of females is gen-
der-based discrimination under Title VII. In making this ruling the court
articulated a number of criteria. First, in order to establish a prima facie case
of gender discrimination by way of sexual harassment a plaintiff must plead
and prove that submission to the sexual advances of a superior was a term or
condition of employment. 50 Second, Title VII does not provide relief for a
"mere flirtation" that has no substantial effect on the plaintiff's employ-
ment.5' Finally, a plaintiff must plead and prove that employees of the
opposite gender were not similarly affected by the alleged harassment of the
employer. 52  The court emphasized, however, that as in other areas of
employment discrimination it is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove that
the sexual harassment was the result of a company-directed policy. To
require such proof would be to extend a claim for relief with one hand and to
take it away with the other.5 3 The criteria articulated by the Heelan court
subsequently reflected the better weight of court and administrative author-
ity in the sexual harassment area.
SEXUAL HARASSMENT As GENDER-BASED DISCRIMINATION UNDER
TITLE VII: CONSTRUCTING A CAUSE OF ACTION
Title VII was drafted primarily to remedy discrimination based on race,
national origin, and religion. The amendment adding "sex" as a prohibited
employment criterion was inserted into the 1964 Act on the floor of the
House by Representative Howard Smith of Virginia who stated that he
wanted to prevent discrimination against the "minority sex." '5 4 Congress-
46. 441 F. Supp. at 466.
47. See notes 166-74 and accompanying text infra.
48. 441 F. Supp. at 466. The court stated that it "agrees that an employer may be liable for
the discriminatory acts of its agents or supervisory personnel if it fails to investigate complaints of
such discrimination. The failure to investigate gives tacit support to the discrimination because
the absence of sanctions encourages abusive behavior." Id.
49. 451 F. Supp. 1382, 1388 (D. Colo. 1978).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1388-89.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Smith). See also Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d
983, 990-91 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091
(5th Cir. 1975).
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man Smith had actually opposed the passage of Title VII and was accused by
some of attempting to sabotage its passage by means of the "sex amend-
ment."5 5 In any event, little legislative history exists to aid the courts in
interpreting the meaning and scope of such a complex and evasive phenome-
non as discrimination "on account of sex." 5 Moreover, the statute itself
does not even define "discrimination."
5 1
In contrast to many early decisions by the federal district courts, a review
of current decisions indicates that a cause of action is readily available under
Title VII for acts of sexual harassment. In analyzing these decisions, it is
again important to keep the statutory framework in mind. There is often a
tendency to conclude that sexual activity is prohibited by Title VII simply for
the reason that there is no apparent business justification for such conduct.
As previously discussed, the statute provides that a practice must first be
determined discriminatory before the bona fide occupational qualification
justification of section 703(e) may be considered.58
Once it is determined that employment-related conduct is of a sexual
nature and is directed at one gender by the employer or the employer's agent,
a violation of Title VII results. The BFOQ defense which otherwise would be
available in a disparate treatment case is simply inoperative in the sexual
harassment area. The most imaginative attorney would be hard-pressed to
assert that a practice of sexual harassment directed at one gender is justified
as a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the safe and
efficient operation of a business. Accordingly, to state a successful claim
under the statute a plaintiff must plead and prove that the conduct is sexual
in nature, discriminatory within an employment context, and in some way
attributable to the employer. The remainder of this article analyzes the
problems and policy issues addressed by the courts and the EEOC in devel-
oping a cause of action for acts of sexual harassment under Title VII.
55. 110 CONG. REC. 2581-82 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Green in response to remarks of Rep.
Smith).
56. Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1166-67 (1971); Note, Classification on the Basis of
Sex and the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 50 IoWA L. REV. 778, 791 (1965).
57. In order of their historical development, Alfred Blumrosen articulated three concepts
describing the nature of employment discrimination. First, acts causing economic harm to an
individual that are motivated by personal antipathy to the group of which that individual is a
member are discriminatory. Proof of discrimination requires evidence of an act, motive (mens
rea), and harm. Second, economic harm caused to an individual by treating members of his or
her minority group in a less favorable manner than similarly situated members of the majority
group is discriminatory. Proof involves evidence of differential treatment and harm, but defense
of justification is available. Third, conduct that has an adverse effect on minority group
members is discriminatory. The defense of justification for compelling reasons of business
necessity is recognized in these disparate impact cases. Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs
v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MucH. L. REV. 59, 67
(1972).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976). See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
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Defining Sexual Harassment
When addressing claims of sexual harassment as sex discrimination under
Title VII it is suggested that the allegedly impermissible conduct must be
subjected to an initial test of "sexuality" before determining whether the
conduct is directed solely at one gender in an employment context. Although
an employer imposing different terms and conditions of employment on
females than on similarly situated males without business justification will be
found to violate the statute irrespective of whether the conduct is "sexual" in
nature, an analysis of allegedly "sexually harassing" conduct aside from the
issue of discriminatory application is useful as a pedagogical tool.
With respect to the problem of defining a "sexual" advance, the most
comprehensive effort was made jointly by Redbook magazine and the Har-
vard Business Review. 59 In an attempt to measure opinions on and aware-
ness of the issue of sexual harassment in the workforce, 7,408 questionnaires
were mailed to Harvard Business Review subscribers in the United States,
and 1,846 replies, representing approximately twenty-five percent of the
mailed questionnaires, were tabulated. Furthermore, to serve as a bench-
mark for the sample, the surveyors provided the respondents with the EEOC
guidelines on sexual harassment in the introduction to the questionnaire.
Finally, to ensure a representative response from women, a questionnaire
was mailed to virtually every Redbook subscriber in the United States. This
produced a male/female ratio of thirty-two percent to sixty-eight percent,
and a resulting overall response of fifty-two percent male and forty-four
percent female.
Respondents were given various fact situations and asked whether that
behavior constituted sexual harassment and whether they had either heard of
or observed such behavior in their organizations. While the respondents
generally agreed that the extreme fact situations constituted sexual harass-
ment, there was disagreement regarding the ambiguous situations.6 0  As
summarized by the researchers, the perceived seriousness of the conduct was
a function of who made the advance, the apparent intent of the actor, and
the victim's perception of the consequences for failure to acquiesce.
Part of the problem in ascertaining a definition of sexual harassment from
court and administrative decisions is the terminology used when resolving
claims under section 703 of the statute. For example, courts have denied
59. Collins & Blodgett, Sexual Harassment ... Some See It ... Some Won't, HARV. Bus.
REV., Mar.-Apr. 1981, at 76, 78.
60. The results are reproduced in the following two exhibits:
EXHIBIT I
The situations listed below are four of the 14 listed in the survey that were perceived by most
people to be misconduct. In these extreme cases, there was a minimal difference of opinion
between men and women and between upper and lower level management. For instance, the
first listed situation-"I can't seem to go in and out of my boss' office without being patted or
pinched"-was regarded as harassment by 89 % of the men and 92 % of the 1,846 respondents.
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Almost 87% of the upper level management and 91% of the lower level management viewed the
situation as harassment.
VIEWS ON EXTREME BEHAVIOR
(based on percentage of 1,846 total respondents)
Not
Harass-
ment.
Possi-
bly harass-
ment.
Sexual
Harass-
ment.
Heard of or
Don't observed in
know. company.
Not heard of
or observed
in company.
I can't seem to go in and out of my
boss' office without being patted or
pinched.
Mr. X has told me that it would be
good for my career if we went out to-
gether. I guess that means it would be
bad for my career if I said no.
Mr. X has asked me to have sex with
him. I refused, but now I learn that
he's given me a poor evaluation.
I have been having an affair with the
head of my division. Now I've told him
I want to break it off, but he says I will
lose out on the promotion I've been
expecting.
1% 8% 90% 1% 14% 83%
2% 17% 79% 2% 12% 85%
1% 20% 78% 1% 10% 87%
4% 7% 87% 2% 7% 90%
Id. at 84.
EXHIBIT II
Less extreme examples of harassment included in the survey produced a greater divergence of
opinion. This part of the survey also measured the perceived seriousness of the harassment based
on whether the harasser was the female employee's supervisor or coworker. In all but two of
these situations, the supervisor's behavior was rated more serious than the coworker's. This result
exemplifies a major finding of this survey that sexual harassment is perceived as an issue of
power. That is, the more powerful the individual, the more threatening the behavior is to the
employee.
VIEWS ON LEsS EXTREME BEHAVIOR
BASED ON SUPERVISOR/COWORKIR SPLIT SAMPLE
[The response to supervisor harassment is listed first
with response to coworker harassment following the slash]
Not Possi- Sexual
Harass- bly harass- Harass-
meit. ment. ment.
Whenever I go into the office my su-
pervisor (a man I work with) eyes me
up and down, making me feel uncom- 20%/
fortable. 26%
My supervisor (a man I work with)
starts each day with a sexual remark.
He insists it's an innocent social com- 5%/
ment. 10%
Heard of or
Don't observed in
know. company.
60%/ 16%/ 4%/ 61%/ 37%/
54% 15% 4% 71% 27%
46%/ 44%/ 4%/ 35%/ 63%!
49% 37% 4% 45% 53%
Not heard of
or observed
in company.
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relief under the statute because the conduct complained of did not involve
the imposition of a term or condition on employment, even though the
conduct at issue clearly involved a sexual advance.6 1  Other courts have
concluded that the statute has not been violated because the acts complained
of were simply not "sexually harassing."6' 2  Still other courts assumed out-
right that the acts were sexual advances, but nevertheless resolved the case
against the plaintiff by concluding that the conduct was an "isolated inci-
dent" that was "personal" in nature."3 Frequently, concluding that an act of
sexual harassment was "isolated" or "personal" would mean either that the
act was not employment-related or if employment-related, the act was for
some reason not attributable to the employer. An example would be an
unwelcome pinch by a coworker or a half-serious invitation for sexual activ-
ity by a supervisor.
It seems clear that the conduct complained of must be both "sexual" and
"harassing" in order to fall within the sexual harassment proscriptions as
outlined by recent court and administrative interpretations. In this respect
Halpert v. Wertheim(4 is particularly noteworthy. In Halpert, the District
Not Possi- Sexual Heard of or Not heard of
Harass- bly harass- Harass- Don't observed in or observed
ment. ment. ment. know. company. in company.
Often in meetings my supervisor (a
man I work with) continually glances 62%/ 26%/ 1%/ 10%/ 50%/ 47%/
at me. 65% 26% 2% 6% 61% 36%
Every time we meet, my supervisor (a
man I work with) kisses me on the 4%/ 43%/ 46%/ 7%/ 11%/ 86%/
cheek. 17% 47% 20% 10% 18% 79%
My supervisor (a man I work with)
asked me out on a date. Although 1 10%/ 39%/ 48%/ 4%/ 26%/ 71%/
refused, he continues to ask me. 13% 41% 20% 5% 42% 56%
My supervisor (a man I work with)
puts his hand on my arm when making 43%/ 44%/ 3%/ 10%/ 59%/ 36%/
a point. 46% 42% 4% 9% 63% 33%
Id. at 85.
61. See, e.g., Smith v. Amoco Chem. Corp., 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 724 (S.D. Tex. 1979);
Neeley v. American Fidelity Assurance Co., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 482 (N.D. Okla. 1978);
Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 562
F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
62. See, e.g., Vinson v. Taylor, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 37 (D.D.C. 1980) (no Title VII
claim when plaintiff's sexual relations with employer were voluntary and unrelated to continued
employment).
63. See, e.g., Fisher v. Flynn, 598 F.2d 663, 666 (1st Cir. 1979) (Richey, J.); Smith v. Rust
Eng'r Co., 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1172, 1173 (N.D. Ala. 1978); Miller v. Bank of Am., 418 F.
Supp. 233, 235 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd, 600 F.2d 211 (9 Cir. 1979); Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F.
Supp. 654, 660 (D.D.C. 1976), vacated, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Barnes v. Train, 13
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 123, 124 (D.D.C. 1974), rev'd sub nom. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983
(D.C. Cir. 1977).
64. 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. 31,243 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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Court for the Southern District of New York held that a female securities
trader was not the subject of sexual harassment under the statute by virtue of
her exposure to coarse language, including references to male and female
genitalia and to sexual activity. Although the court found that plaintiff
Halpert was at times the subject of such language, as were other women, the
court stressed that the language did not involve "harassment" in light of the
fact that plaintiff used such "truck driver" language. 65
Also significant is Bundy v. Jackson,"" in which the District Court for the
District of Columbia found that the acts complained of did constitute sexual
advances, but nevertheless rejected plaintiff's Title VII claim because none of
the advances were harassing. No fewer than three supervisors had made
sexual advances to the plaintiff. The record further indicated that one super-
visor had on numerous occasions called plaintiff into his office to discuss his
theory that women rode horseback to obtain sexual relief.6 7  The same
supervisor also suggested that plaintiff come to his apartment to view books
that could not be purchased in a bookstore. A second supervisor made sexual
suggestions which included a vacation for two in the Bahamas.68  When
plaintiff finally registered a complaint to a third supervisor, he too informed
her that he wanted to have sexual relations with her, and later told her that
"any man in his right mind would want to rape [her]." 6 9
While the district court's decision that the conduct was not harassing is
puzzling, especially in light of the court's finding that sexual advances were
made, the Bundy decision arguably can be reconciled with current law. The
court's decision that the sexual advances were not "harassing" was, in part,
based on a finding that the acts complained of were not considered either
unusual or highly improper and insulting. 70 Indeed, the plaintiff waited a
full two years after the first advance was made in 1972 before making an
informal, oral complaint in late 1974. Moreover, the court concluded that
plaintiff's 1975 complaint was triggered by her eligibility for a promotion
rather than feeling harassed by the sexual advances of her supervisors. 7'
Arguably, the court's holding that the advances were not harassing was
premised on an implicit finding that the sexual advances were not unwel-
come to the plaintiff.
What is important in this regard is the recognition that in asserting a cause
of action under Title VII it may not be sufficient merely to prove sexual
advances were made that would be considered harassing to most employees.
As other courts have done, the Bundy court indicated that the plaintiff's
65. Id. at 117,560.
66. 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 828 (D.D.C. 1979).
67. Id. at 830.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. The court noted that plaintiff's complaints of sexual molestation were not taken seri-
ously. Plaintiff's superiors appeared to consider the making of sexual advances to female employ-
ees as merely a game that was played. Id. at 832.
71. Id. at 831.
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response to the advances, including the timing of any complaints, would be
closely scrutinized in determining whether conduct was in fact "harass-
ing."' 72  Thus, a female who voluntarily submits to the sexual advances of a
supervisor or co-employee would not have a cause of action under the
statute, as long as the relationship continued to be consensual.
The Concept of Discrimination
Title VII forbids discrimination only under specific circumstances. As
outlined by Barbara Schlei and Paul Grossman in their treatise on employ-
ment discrimination law, 7:3 discrimination is an unlawful employment prac-
tice only if: (1) committed by a "respondent" 74 cognizable under Title VII;
(2) on a "basis" 75 cognizable under the Act; (3) with regard to an "issue" 76
cognizable under Title VII; and (4) where a causal connection, or nexus,
exists between the basis and the issue.
Two theories by which the causal connection or nexus may be proved are
"disparate treatment" and "disparate impact." The most easily understood
type of discrimination is disparate treatment, which involves treating an
individual less favorably than others similarly situated because of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. 77 Proof of a discriminatory motive is re-
quired, although it may be inferred from the mere fact of a difference in
treatment.78  Disparate impact involves employment practices that are fa-
cially neutral but which have a discriminatory effect that cannot be justified
by business necessity. 7  Proof of a discriminatory motive is not required
under a disparate impact theory. 80
While both the disparate treatment and impact theories are often applica-
ble in a given factual situation, claims of sexual harassment fall most fre-
quently within the disparate treatment category. A typical fact pattern
72. Id. Accord, Vinson v. Taylor, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. 37, 41 (D.D.C. 1980) (plaintiff
conceded that she did not file a complaint with any representative of her employer).
. 73. B. SCHLE1 & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DIScIuMINATION LAW 15 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as SCHL E & GROSSMAN].
74. The respondent must be either an employer, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976), an employ-
ment agency, id. § 2000e(c), or a labor organization, id. § 2000e(d). SCHLE3 & GROSSMAN, supra
note 73, at 15.
75. The statutory bases are race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(1) (1976). SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 73, at 15.
76. The cognizable issues are: hiring, discharging, compensation, contract terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976); limitations, segregation or
classification of employees or applicants for employment, id. § 2000e-2(a)(2); unwillingness to
refer, id. § 2000e-2(b); exclusion or expulsion from membership, id. § 2000e-2(c)(1); limitation,
segregation, or classification of membership, id. § 2000e-2(c)(2); retaliation, id. § 2000e-3(a);
printing or publishing a discriminatory employment notice or advertisement, id. § 20O0e-3(b).
SCHLEa & GROSSMAN, supra note 73, at 15.
77. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 325 n.15
(1977).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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involves the discharge, 81 transfer,8 2 refusal to promote,83 or elimination of an
employee's job8 4 for refusing to be sexually cooperative. A manager acting
for his employer may also simply fail to hire an individual for another
position within the company because of his or her failure to acquiesce to
sexual advances.8 5
Current law clearly indicates that for a finding of gender discrimination
under the statute it is not necessary that the discriminatory conduct depend
upon a characteristic peculiar to one gender. Employers have argued as a
defense to a charge of gender discrimination that the basis of the discrimina-
tory conduct was the plaintiff's refusal to submit to sexual advances rather
than plaintiff's gender. For instance in Williams v. Saxbe,86 the employer
argued that the supervisor did not discriminate against women since the
"primary variable" of the affected class was refusal to furnish sexual favors,
rather than gender itself. While the employer conceded that examination of
prior gender discrimination decisions revealed that stereotypes regarding
women may have created the class, the company nevertheless asserted that
the actual impetus behind the creation of a class must be distinguished from
the primary variable which defined the class.8 7 The court, in rejecting this
argument, reasoned that the supervisor's conduct placed an effectual barrier
to employment before one gender and not the other, even though both
genders were otherwise similarly situated.
88
81. See, e.g., Williams v. Civiletti, 487 F. Supp. 1387 (D.D.C. 1980) (community service
worker fired for failure to submit to supervisor's sexual advances); Ludington v. Sambo's
Restaurants, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 480 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (waitresses discharged after complaining
that they were subjected to vulgar suggestions and physical contact).
82. See, e.g., Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977)
(plaintiff's request for a transfer following sexual harassment by supervisor resulted in transfer to
inferior position).
83. See, e.g., Bundy v. Jackson, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 828 (D.D.C. 1979) (female
corrections employee allegedly denied promotions for refusing to submit to supervisor's sexual
advances), rev'd, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
84. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (plaintiff's position eliminated after
plaintiff resisted supervisor's sexual advance).
85. Rinkel v. Associated Pipeline Contractors, Inc., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 224 (D. Alaska
1978) (plaintiff allegedly denied another position within firm for refusal to have sex with senior
management official).
86. 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), vacated, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
87. As argued by the company:
In previous sex discrimination cases, this primary variable was gender and, there-
fore, the applicability of the Act was triggered. Thus, conceptually, sexual stereo-
types are irrelevant to the actual determination of whether an impermissible class
exists. For example, if an employer enforced a policy that only women could be
"roustabouts," an impermissible classification would arise, a classification described
by the primary variable, gender, and the Act would be triggered despite the absence
of a sexual stereotype. Therefore, in the instant case, even assuming that a sexual
stereotype was at the root of [the supervisor's] alleged imposition of a sexual condi-
tion, such a factor is irrelevant to the description of the alleged class.
413 F. Supp. at 657.
88. Id.
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Furthermore, the statute is not limited to differentiation based wholly
upon an employee's gender. In Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.,819 the
Supreme Court held that an employer's refusal to hire women with pre-
school age children when no such hiring policy was applied to men could
constitute discrimination within the meaning of Title VII. There was no
evidence that the employer excluded women entirely, because most of the
workforce was female. Nevertheless, since gender was one criterion in em-
ployment, a prima facie violation of Title VII was shown. Other courts, in
analogous fact situations, have similarly concluded that a cause of action was
cognizable under the statute. 0 For example, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia held, in Barnes v. Costle,9' that it is sufficient that
gender is a substantial factor behind the discrimination. The Barnes court
stated that the appellant's gender, not simply her failure to comply with her
89. 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (per curiam).
90. The issue of discrimination between different categories of the same gender has been
addressed repeatedly by the courts. See Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d
1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (grooming regulation applicable to males with long hair not sex-based
discrimination since employer applied personal grooming code to all employees); Sprogis v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971) (unlawful to restrict employment of
married females but not married males, even though most flight attendants were females), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
The classification of employees on the basis of sex plus some other ostensibly neutral character-
istic has generally been termed "sex-plus" discrimination. As stated by the Fifth Circuit in
Willingham:
The practical effect of interpreting [42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2] to include this type of
discrimination is to impose an equal protection gloss upon the statute, i.e., similarly
situated individuals of either sex cannot be discriminated against vis-a-vis members
of their own sex unless the same distinction is made with respect to those of the
opposite sex. Such an interpretation may be necessary in order to counter some
rather imaginative efforts by employers to circumvent [42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2].
507 F.2d at 1089.
It is noteworthy that Congress defeated an amendment that would have added the word
"solely" to the bill, modifying "sex," 110 CONG. REC. 2728 (1964), thereby providing some
legislative support for the inclusion of "sex-plus" discrimination within the proscription of § 703.
See Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1089. In addition, the EEOC has stated in its guidelines on sex
discrimination that "so long as sex is a factor in the application of the rule [restricting the
employment of married women], such application involves a discrimination based on sex." 29
C.F.R. § 1064.4(a) (1981).
While it is clear that not every dissimilarity between the sexes in employment requirements
transgresses the proscription of Title VII, General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 135 (1976),
courts have generally held that those "plus" factors that are based on immutable characteristics
will warrant a finding of gender discrimination. See, e.g., Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990
n.57 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (citing Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1973));
Fagen v. National Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115, 1124-25 (D.C. Cir. 1973). In addition, the
Supreme Court has held that those differentials that have a significant effect on employment
opportunities of one gender will warrant a finding of gender discrimination. Nashville Gas Co.
v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977). Moreover, courts are receptive to allegations of discrimination
based on constitutionally protected activities such as marriage or child-rearing because they
present insurmountable obstacles to one gender. See Earwood v. Continental S.E. Lines, Inc.,
539 F.2d 1349 (4th Cir. 1976) (dicta).
91. 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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supervisor's sexual demands, was essential to her loss of position unless the
employer could show that similar demands were placed on male employ-
ees.
92
Current law also indicates that an employer will not be successful in
defending a sexual harassment charge by a female by merely proffering the
argument that males may be equally harassed.9 3 Likewise, it is no defense to
assert that a similar condition could be imposed on a male subordinate by a
heterosexual female supervisor, or upon a subordinate of either gender by a
homosexual superior of the same gender.9 4 As expressed by the District of
Columbia Circuit, these situations are to be distinguished from the case
where a bisexual supervisor harasses employees of both genders equally.
Under the bisexual situation, the insistence upon sexual favors would not
constitute gender discrimination because it would apply to male and female
employees alike.9 5
Condition of Employment
When ruling on complaints alleging acts of sexual harassment, courts have
indicated that a distinction must be made between complaints alleging sex-
ual advances of an individual or personal nature and those alleging adverse
employment consequences flowing directly from those advances. Declaring
92. Id. at 991-92. As summarized by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in
Barnes:
To briefly illustrate, suits have been entertained where a woman charged that she
was fired because she was pregnant and unmarried, notwithstanding the fact that no
other woman was Ascharged for that reason, and where a male nurse asserted that
he was denied assignments to care for female patients, although no allegations were
made with respect to the assignments of other male nurses. Close analogies emerge
from situations wherein a black woman was terminated ostensibly for personality
conflicts but allegedly was told that she probably did not need the job anyway
because she was married to a white male, and where a white woman attributed loss
of her job to her relationship with a black man. In each of these instances, a cause of
action was recognized although it did not appear that any other individual of the
same gender or race had been mistreated by the employer.
Id. at 993-94.
93. In reversing the district court, the Third Circuit stated, in Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec.
& Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977):
In holding that there was no sex discrimination because "gender lines might as
easily have been reversed, or even not crossed at all," .. . the district court took
much too narrow a view of what can constitute sex based discrimination under Title
VII. It is not necessary to a finding of a violation that the discriminatory practice
depend upon a characteristic "peculiar to one of the genders,". . . or that the
discrimination be directed at all members of a sex ... It is only necessary to show
that gender is a substantial factor in the discrimination and that if the plaintiff "had
been a man she would not have been treated in the same manner."
Id. at 1046 n.4.
94. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
95. Id. See also Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 659 n.6 (D.D.C. 1976), vacated, 587
F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1979); EEOC Dec. No. 70401, 2 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 427 (1970).
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that "the protection of the rights of equality in employment guaranteed by
Title VII must be balanced against the unauthorized use of the statute as the
vehicle for maintenance of personal non-employment claims," the District
Court for the Northern District of Alabama held, in Smith v. Rust Engineer-
ing Co.,9' that claims of sexual advances and remarks must be related to
some term or condition of employment in order to state a claim under Title
VII. The court granted summary judgment for the employer even though the
court assumed, for purposes of the motion, that the acts of which plaintiff
complained were "sexual advances." The Smith court ruled that the uncon-
troverted facts established that no "nexus" existed between the alleged state-
ments and any term or condition of employment.9 7 Both employees were
cost engineers doing the same type of work. The alleged offender did not
promise plaintiff anything with respect to employment. Moreover, there was
no claim that acquiescence in the sexual advances was made impliedly or
expressly a condition of employment.9 8
In Fisher v. Flynn,"9 the First Circuit likewise emphasized that a successful
complaint must allege facts sufficient to establish a nexus between the sexual
conduct and some term or condition of employment. The Fisher court found
that the romantic adventure at issue was but an "unsatisfactory personal
encounter with no employment repercussions."' 100 As such, the conduct was
not actionable under Title VII.
The issue of a nexus between a sexual advance and a term of employment
arose in a different context in Cordes v. County of Yavapai. '0' In Cordes, a
former legal secretary in the county attorney's office alleged that she was not
reappointed to her position by the new county attorney because of her refusal
to grant sexual favors to him before he became county attorney. Ruling for
the employer, the federal district court of Arizona stated that unlike the
situation in Barnes and Tomkins, the imposition of the "condition of employ-
ment" and the supervisor's "sexual advances" did not coincide. 102 The
Barnes and Tomkins plaintiffs knew, reasoned the Cordes court, that absent
consent to a supervisor's amorous desires, their employment opportunities
would suffer. In the present action, neither the plaintiff nor the defendant
related the sexual advances to the plaintiff's employment.10 3
What is particularly noteworthy in the Cordes case is the court's rejection
of the plaintiff's argument that her supervisor imposed a condition upon her
96. 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1172 (N.D. Alaska 1978). Similarly, in Vinson v. Taylor, 23
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 37, 42 (D.D.C. 1980), the court held that the plaintiff did not state a
cause of action under Title VII because the plaintiff's intimate relationship to her immediate
supervisor was voluntary and unrelated to plaintiffs continued employment or promotion.
97. 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1174.
98. Id. at 1173-74.
99. 598 F.2d 663 (1st Cir. 1979).
100. Id. at 666.
101. 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1224 (D. Ariz. 1978).
102. Id. at 1227.
103. Id.
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reappointment that he did not impose upon male applicants. The court
stated that plaintiff did not state a cause of action since at the time she was
harassed there were no employment ramifications. Moreover, the court de-
clared that spiteful retaliatory conduct, although petty and deplorable, does
not amount: to a condition of employment. 0 4 The Cordes court concluded
that absent an allegation that the supervisor would have reappointed the
plaintiff if she would have granted sexual favors at the time reappointment
was denied, the plaintiff could not maintain that her employer imposed a
present condition of employment in a discriminatory manner. 0 5
Further emphasis that a plaintiff must allege a nexus between the sexual
act and employment in order to establish a cause of action under the statute
can be found in Clark v. World Airways, Inc.106 The court declared that
even assuming that plaintiff was subjected to sexual advances by the presi-
dent and chief stockholder of World Airways, the president did not at any
time relate submission to his advances to the employment prospects of any of
the complaining females. 0 7 At no point did the president either explicitly or
implicitly threaten to terminate plaintiff's employment or otherwise disad-
vantage her if she did not acquiesce. In fact, after plaintiff rebuffed one
advance, the president called a company car for her. Moreover, the court
observed that the advances occurred in a primarily social context, although
the court did recognize that the distinction between a business and social
context is not always clear. 0 8
While current law holds that in order to recover on a claim of sexual
harassment the complaining plaintiff must establish that submission to the
sexual advance was a term or condition of employment, 09 recent interpreta-
tions of the statute, both judicial and administrative, have expanded the
concept of an "employment-related" condition. Specifically, the notion that
Title VII mandates that an employee be provided with a work environment
free from verbal and physical sexual abuse has surfaced in the gender dis-
crimination context. Analogous "hostile environment" theories of employ-
104. id.
105. Id.
106. 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 305 (D.D.C. 1980).
107. Id. at 307.
108. Id. at 308 n.9.
109. E.g., EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1660, 1662 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(holding that a plaintiff must establish that a condition of employment was imposed by the
employer on the basis of gender); Smith v. Amoco Chem. Corp., 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 724,
726 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (foreman's verbal passes insufficient to give rise to Title VII violation when
plaintiff not terminated for rejecting advances); Neeley v. American Fidelity Assurance Co., 17
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 482, 485 (N.D. Okla. 1978) (employer did not violate statute when male
vice-president told female employee dirty jokes and placed his hands on her shoulders while
explaining work assignment when (1) employer was unaware of vice-president's acts; (2) em-
ployer had policy against sexual advances at workplace; and (3) none of the acts of the vice-
president were made conditions of female's employment, i.e., she was not required to submit to
such acts or endure such treatment in order to maintain her job and enjoy rights of employment).
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ment discrimination have developed in the race," 0 national origin"' and
religion" 2 contexts.
110. See, e.g., Winfrey v. Metropolitan Util. Dist., 467 F. Supp. 56 (D. Neb. 1979) (fore-
man's reference to black meter reader as "boy" falls short of Title VII violation since foreman
personally apologized); EEOC Dec. No. 76-89, [1980] EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 6667 (1976)
(holding that the psychological as well as economic conditions of employment are entitled to
protection, and that the phrase "terms, conditions, and privileges of employment" as set forth in
§ 703 encompasses the practice of creating and maintaining a working atmosphere free of ethnic
and racial discrimination).
In Higgins v. Gates Rubber Co., 578 F.2d 281 (10th Cir. 1978), the plaintiff alleged that the
lower court erred in not holding that his employer committed an unlawful employment practice
by not providing him a workplace free from racial insults, invectives, intimidation, or other
forms of racial discrimination. In Higgins, evidence of the plaintiff's work environment was
introduced at the trial court for the purpose of ascertaining whether an assault by plaintiff was
justified by the provocation of other employees. The lower court held that the assault on the
plaintiff, in and of itself, cannot be held to justify an assault or battery upon another person.
Absent a finding that the employer was or should have been aware of this unfavorable atmos-
phere, the Tenth Circuit stated that it could not hold that the trial court erred as a matter of law
by not finding defendant in violation of Title VII. 578 F.2d at 283.
111. See, e.g., Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 568 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1977)
(upholding lower court's determination that use of ethnic slurs by employee's supervisor did not
amount to a violation of Title VII when comments made were part of casual conversation and
were not excessive or shameful); Kidd v. American Air Filter Co., 23 Empl. Prac. Dec. 31,126
(W.D. Ky. 1980) (disrespect and prejudice by fellow employees not within ambit of Title VII
unless "excessive and opprobrious"); Fekete v. U.S. Steel Corp., 353 F. Supp. 1177 (W.D. Pa.
1973) (no violation of Title VII for isolated acts of harassment which the employer did not
always know about but which the employer took steps to prevent when informed); EEOC Dec.
No. 74-05, 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 834 (1973) (holding that Title VII requires an employer to
maintain an atmosphere free of racial and ethnic intimidation and insult by taking positive
action when necessary to redress or eliminate employee intimidation); EEOC Dec. No. 72-1561,
4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 852 (1972) (reasonable cause to believe statute was violated when
employer tolerated atmosphere of intimidation in which blacks and Spanish-surnamed employ-
ees were subjected to barrage of racial and ethnic "jokes" and derogatory restroom wall graffiti);
EEOC Dec. No. 72-0621, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 312 (1971) (reasonable cause found where
employer transferred Spanish-surnamed employee to different work area after employee com-
plained of repeated on-the-job harassment by a nonsupervisory Anglo employee); EEOC Dec.
No. 70-683, 2 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 606 (1970) (derogatory remarks made by supervisors to
Spanish-surnamed employees constituted unlawfully disparate term or condition of employ-
ment); EEOC Dec. No. CL 68-12-431EU, 2 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 295 (1969) (holding that
employer violated Title VII by permitting acts of harassment of foreign-born employee, includ-
ing: (1) subjecting employee to Polish jokes and other vulgar Polish names and general deroga-
tory remarks; (2) driving a vehicle at him only to stop short of striking him; (3) throwing objects
at his feet; (4) lighting welding torches near his face; (5) assigning him jobs beyond his physical
capacity; and (6) requiring him to sweep out the plant while other employees rested).
112. See, e.g., Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157, 160-61 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (Title
VII violated when a person vested with managerial responsibilities demeaned an employee
because of the employee's professed religious views); Marlowe v. General Motors Corp., 11 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 1357 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (employer did not violate Title VII's ban on religious
discrimination despite other workers' harassment of Jewish employee where record indicated
that (1) the harassment, intimidation, or coercion of employees violated shop rules; (2) the
employer had a policy against harassment and intimidation and investigated all reported inci-
dents of harassment; and (3) in most instances the employer had been unable to identify the
perpetrator of the act, but where identification was confirmed, that employee had been disci-
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The EEOC has promulgated guidelines on employment discrimination," 3
including a recent guideline on sexual harassment." 4 Although the EEOC
does not define sexual harassment, section 1604.11(a) provides that harass-
ment on the basis of sex is a violation of the Act and that such unwelcome
behavior may be either verbal or physical." 5 The guidelines articulate three
criteria for determining whether a violation exists, including the situation
when "conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offen-
sive working environment."" 6  Thus the EEOC appears to have interpreted
Title VII to include within its gender discrimination proscription the guaran-
tee of a work environment free from verbal and physical sexual abuse.
Several recent cases reveal a judicial interpretation of Title VII analogous
to that of the EEOC. An early example of this theory was argued in Tomkins
v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co.," 7 in which the Third Circuit held that
an employee's allegation that her employment was conditioned on her ac-
ceptance of the sexual favors of a male supervisor did state a claim under
Title VII. Tomkins, the plaintiff, argued that in addition to prohibiting
specific discriminatory acts, the statute mandates that employees be afforded
"a work environment free from the psychological harm flowing from an
atmosphere of discrimination."" 8 Tomkins contended that analogous to the
EEOC's findings of Title VII violations when employees are subjected to
supervisors' racial epithets and ethnic jokes, Title VII affords protection from
sexual advances and subsequent retaliatory harassment that creates an envi-
plined); EEOC Dec. No. 72-1114, [1973] EEOC COMPL. MAN. (CCH) 6347 (reasonable cause
existed to believe that employer violated statute by allowing supervisor to preach about his
religious views to employees during working hours when employee subjectively felt that job
security could be affected by his reaction to his supervisor's conduct).
113. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1-11 (1981).
114. Id. § 1604.11 (effective November 10, 1980).
It is noteworthy that in Clark v. World Airways, Inc., 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 305 (D.D.C.
1980), the plaintiff argued in the alternative that if the alleged advances did not constitute a term
or condition of employment, they may still violate Title VII under the then published EEOC
Interim Guidelines. The court ruled that the weight to be accorded these regulations is slight
because they are interim regulations offered, in part, to secure public comment. In any event,
the evidence did not support a finding that plaintiff's employer's conduct had the effect of
substantially interfering with her work environment. Id. at 308 n.1l.
115. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1981).
116. Id. § 1604.11(a)(3). The full text of § 1604.11(a) reads:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical
conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to such
conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's
employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used
as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct
has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
Id.
117. 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
118. Id. at 1046 n.1.
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ronment of "debilitating sexual intimidation," thereby constituting a barrier
to employment opportunities."" Because the court of appeals held, how-
ever, that the sexual demands of Tomkins' supervisor did constitute a cause
of action, it declined to rule on the hostile environment argument proffered
by the plaintiff.
In Brown v. City of Guthrie,120 the District Court for the Western District
of Oklahoma considered a claim falling within the hostile environment
category of the EEOC Guidelines. The plaintiff was hired by the city's police
department and assigned to dispatch and communication duties. She subse-
quently was given additional duties and placed on 24-hour call, requiring
her to report to the police station at any time of the day or night to search the
female prisoners taken into custody. The record indicated that during her
tenure of employment Brown was continually harassed by her shift com-
mander. As a usual practice, magazines containing photographs of nude
women were stored in the dispatcher's desk for the policemen to look at in
their spare time. 121 Brown was shown nude pictures by her supervisor and
asked to compare herself with the women displayed in the magazines. An-
other incident involved a call to the police station at two a.m. to perform a
search of a female prisoner. Although Brown conducted the search in a
private room, she was later shown a videotape of the search by the police
officers on duty who critiqued her efforts. Moreover, her commander repeat-
edly played the tape back commenting to Brown on the physical attributes of
the prisoner. On other occasions her supervisor entered the dispatcher's area
and made lewd sexual gestures and remarks derogatory to the female gender.
The Brown court ruled that the plaintiff established the factual part of her
prima facie case, namely, that as a female she was subjected to such sexual
harassment from her supervisor that she was forced to terminate her employ-
ment.112  The court cited extensively from Judge Goldberg's opinion in
Rogers v. EEOC. 123 In Rogers, the Fifth Circuit was among the first courts
to state that Title VII mandates that employees be afforded a work environ-
ment free from the psychological harm flowing from an atmosphere of
discrimination. The Rogers court emphasized that Title VII was innovative
legislation that should be interpreted liberally in order to effectuate its
purpose of eliminating the inconvenience, unfairness, and humiliation of
ethnic discrimination. 24 Further, the court noted that Title VII protection
extends to the psychological as well as to the economic interests of the
employee. 125 Accordingly, the Brown court held that sexual harassment that
permeates the workplace, thereby creating an intimidating, hostile, or offen-
119. Id.
120. 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1627 (W.D. Okla. 1980).
121. Id. at 1629.
122. Id. at 1631.
123. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
124. 454 F.2d at 238.
125. Id. at 238. See also Brown v. City of Guthrie, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1627, 1632
(W.D. Okla. 1974) (citing Rogers).
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sive work environment, is an impermissible condition of employment under
Title VII. 2 6 In so ruling, however, the court made it clear that the statute
would not be violated every time a supervisor makes a sexually oriented
advance or comment toward an employee. 127
Similar to Brown, the Supreme Court of Minnesota held, in Continental
Can Co. v. State, 28 that verbal and physical sexual harassment directed at a
female employee by fellow male employees may constitute sex discrimination
under Minnesota's fair employment statute. 12 9  The conduct at issue in-
volved the comments of three male employees to a female coworker that they
could make her feel good sexually and that due to their sexual prowess, she
would want to leave her husband. Other derogatory sexual remarks were
made including a reference by one of the employees to the movie Mandingo.
The plaintiff was told by her co-employee that he wished slavery days would
return so that he could train her to be his sexual slave. 30 Although plaintiff
reported these incidents, without identifying the source of the remarks, her
employer informed her that nothing could be done about the conduct and
that she should expect that type of behavior when working with men.
Finally, after plaintiff reported an incident in which one of the male employ-
ees grabbed her between the legs, the employer conducted an investigation.
In ruling for the female employee, the court applied principles developed
in analogous Title VII cases as well as the EEOC Guidelines. The court
reasoned that conditioning employment on adaption to, and tolerance of, an
environment of pervasive sexual harassment, imposed solely on female em-
ployees, is discrimination as invidious as requiring sexual favors for employ-
ment. 13  As a remedy the employer was issued an order to cease and desist
from discriminating against any person because of gender with respect to
126. 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1632. The District of Columbia Circuit in Bundy v. Jackson,
641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981), further declared that there could be no question the "discrimina-
tory environment" cases were applicable to sexual harassment "which injects the most demean-
ing sexual stereotypes into the general work environment and which always represents an
intentional assault on the individual's innermost privacy." Id. at 945 (citing Brown).
127. 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1632. Citing Heelan v. Johns-Manville Corp., 451 F. Supp.
1382 (D. Colo. 1978), and the EEOC's recently published guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11
(1980), the court emphasized that "the exact quantum of harassment necessary to trigger the
protection of Title VII is not clear." 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1632.
128. 297 N.W.2d 241 (Minn. 1980).
129. The Minnesota Human Rights Act provides in relevant part: "Except when based on a
bona fide occupational qualification, it is an unfair employment practice . . . (2) for an em-
ployer because of ... sex ... to discriminate against a person with respect to his hire, tenure,
compensation, terms, upgrading, conditions, facilities, or privileges of employment." MINN.
STAT. § 363.03(1)(2)(c)(1978).
Interpreting this section, the Continental Can court held that "the prohibition against sex
discrimination in Minn. Stat. § 363.03, subd. (1)(2)(c) (1978) includes sexual harassment which
impacts on the conditions of employment when the employer knew or should have known of the
employees' conduct alleged to constitute sexual harassment and fails to take timely and appropri-
ate action." 297 N.W.2d at 249.
130. 297 N.W.2d at 245-46.
131. Id. at 248.
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terms and conditions of employment. 32  In addition, the employer was
ordered to take prompt action "when it knows or should know of conduct in
the workplace amounting to sexual harassment."
33
In Kyriazi v. Western Electric Co., 3 4 a federal district court acknowl-
edged the importance of a working environment free from sexual harassment
and held that gender-based discrimination resulted when an indecent car-
toon was created, disseminated, and thrust upon a female employee by her
coworkers in order to humiliate her. In addition, the record indicated that
plaintiff's three coworkers "made loud remarks concerning her marital sta-
tus, and trumpeted their speculations and even made wagers concerning her
virginity."'' 35  As in Continental Can, the Kyriazi court found that the
employer's supervisory personnel took no action to correct the situation.
Instead, the court stated that the plaintiff's supervisors were well aware of
the harassment, but they chose to disregard her complaints and failed to take
any action against the employees who harassed her. 36 This conduct, rea-
soned the court, aggravated the situation. 37
As in the cases where the courts found racial harassment, Brown, Conti-
nental Can, and Kyriazi all involved persistent and clearly outrageous con-
duct by either supervisors or co-employees. In all three decisions, the supervi-
sors either directly participated in the conduct or failed to take any actions
after being placed on notice that acts of sexual harassment were present in
the workplace.
A different form of environmental-type sexual harassment was at issue in
EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 3 " where the District Court for the Southern
District of New York denied an employer's motion for summary judgment
against an employee's claim that she was made the subject of sexual harass-
ment when she was forced to wear a revealing and provocative uniform. The
court found that the plaintiff stated a cause of action in that a term or
condition of employment had been imposed by the employer on the basis of
132. Id.
133. Id. at 251.
134. 461 F. Supp. 894 (D.N.J. 1978).
135. Id. at 934.
136. Id: at 935.
137. Id. The court went on to state:
Aside from the implicit encouragement of such harassment which the superiors'
knowing disregard engendered in Kyriazi's male coworkers, such conduct by her
superiors was infuriating to Kyriazi, and justifiably so. When they totally disre-
garded Kyriazi's complaints about the cartoon, and the boisterous speculations about
her virginity, she was left with the understanding that her superiors were discrimi-
nating against her and in favor of her male co-workers.
Id.
In the remedy phase of her trial, the court held that Kyriazi's three coworkers were liable for
$1,500 each in punitive damages. Moreover, the court ordered the company not to indemnify
these men. Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 476 F. Supp. 335 (D.N.J. 1979).
138. 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1660 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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gender since, but for that she was a woman, she would not have been
required to expose her body and to endure the public's sexual harassment.13 9
While recent decisions have held that Title VII provides a remedy for acts
of sexual harassment that create a sexually obnoxious atmosphere at the
workplace, they have not interpreted the statute as mandating that the
employer provide each employee with a working environment suitable to his
or her liking. For example, in Halpert v. Wertheim, 40 the District Court for
the Southern District of New York rejected the sexual harassment claim of a
female securities trader who claimed that she was verbally harassed by other
traders at the desk. The court noted that the trading desk was operated in a
chaotic manner, and that the language of the market place was coarse.
Frequent references were made to male and female genitalia and to sexual
activity. The court held that although plaintiff Halpert was the subject of
such language on occasion, as were other women with whom the traders had
contact, this sexually obnoxious work atmosphere did not constitute harass-
ment of Halpert or demonstrate an intent to discriminate.'
Similarly, in Gan v. Kepro Circuit Systems, Inc.,'42 the federal court for
the Eastern District of Missouri held that a female failed to make a prima
facie case for constructive discharge through the maintenance by the em-
ployer of a distasteful working environment, at least where it was found that
she welcomed and encouraged the alleged sexually harassing conduct. The
court found that during the course of her employment the plaintiff regularly
used crude and vulgar language and initiated sexually oriented conversations
with her male and female coworkers. The record indicates that she fre-
quently asked male employees about their marital sex lives and whether they
engaged in extra-marital sexual relationships. Moreover, plaintiff was found
to have volunteered information to coworkers concerning the intimate details
of her pre-marital sexual encounters with her husband. Although the court
determined that the working environment was "permeated by an extensive
amount of lewd and vulgar conversation and conduct," 143 and that supervi-
sory personnel were aware of this conduct, the court concluded that the
plaintiff was not subjected to unprovoked propositions and sexually sugges-
tive remarks. In the words of the court, "any such propositions that did occur
were prompted by her own sexual aggressiveness and her own sexually
explicit conversations." ' 44
It is not clear in the Halpert decision whether plaintiff's sexual harassment
claim concerning the working environment failed because the acts were not
of a sexual nature, or, alternatively, because the environment was not pol-
luted to the level required to trigger the protection of the statute. Of note in
Halpert is the court's finding that the plaintiff had at times used the very
139. Id. at 1662.
140. 24 Emnpl. Prac. Dec. 31,243 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
141. Id. at 17,560.
142. 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 639 (E.D. Mo. 1982).
143. Id. at 640.
144. Id.
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language that she complained created an offensive working environment. An
alternative explanation of Halpert is that the courts will apply a flexible
standard of what constitutes a discriminatory environment gauged with
regard to the conditions inherent in the particular work environment and the
plaintiff's subjective reaction.
In this same regard courts have long recognized that an employer cannot
be an insurer against all insults and racial and sexual incidents, and cannot
reasonably be expected to provide a work environment that is completely
pure. 14 s The Ninth Circuit has stated in Silver v. KCA, Inc. 46 that the
"specific evil at which Title VII was directed was not the eradication of all
discrimination by private individuals, undesirable though it is, but the eradi-
cation of discrimination by employers against employees." 4 7 As best noted
by one commentator: "Against a large part of the frictions and irritations and
clashing of temperaments incident to participating in community life, a
certain toughening of the mental hide is a better protection than the law ever
could be." 48
Employer Liability
Assuming the plaintiff establishes that he or she was subjected to sexually
harassing conduct that was discriminatorily applied within an employment
context, it is still necessary to establish that the employer, as defined by the
statute, was responsible either directly or vicariously for the conduct. While
in theory a labor organization or employment agency could be subject to
liability under the statute for acts of sexual harassment, in practice it is the
immediate employer who is the likely defendant in a sexual harassment suit.
As such, this section focuses only on the problem of establishing employer
liability under Title VII.
Employer Liability for Acts of Supervisors and Agents
If the alleged harassment is perpetuated by an employee's supervisor, the
employee will have a cause of action directly against the supervisor. 49  The
145. See Higgins v. Gates Rubber Co., 578 F.2d 281 (10th Cir. 1978) (dictum) (employer not
required to provide working environment devoid of racial prejudice); Purvine v. Boyd Coffee
Co., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1015 (D. Or. 1976) (holding that Title VII does not make an
employer responsible for every inconsiderate remark made by office personnel); Fekete v. United
States Steel Corp., 353 F. Supp. 1177 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (occasional harassment of Hungarian
employee because of unconventional habits not cognizable under Title VII).
146. 586 F.2d 138 (9th Cir. 1978).
147. Id. at 141.
148. Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REv.
1033, 1035 (1936). See also Howard v. National Cash Register Co., 388 F. Supp. 603, 606 (S.D.
Ohio 1975).
149. Title VII defines an employer against whom suit may be instituted as "a person engaged
in an industry affecting commerce. . . . and any agent of such a person." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)
(1976). See, e.g., Mumford v. James T. Barnes Co., 411 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Mich. 1977). See
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1(3) (1958).
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possibility of agent/supervisor liability does not, however, protect the em-
ployer from joint and several liability as well.
As noted in the early case analysis, federal district courts were initially
reluctant to hold employers liable for the alleged sexual harassment of their
supervisors. 150  Many of the decisions required a showing that the supervi-
sory conduct was pursuant to a company policy or plan, thereby precluding
employer liability for the "personal proclivity, peculiarity or mannerism" of
the supervisor.' 5' These cases are especially confusing, however, as the
courts' analyses do not distinguish between conduct not actionable under
Title VII and conduct which, although actionable against the immediate
perpetrator/supervisor, will not be attributable to the employer. In this
regard, a review of selected decisions is instructive.
The first federal court of appeals to hear a sexual harassment case was the
Fourth Circuit in Garber v. Saxon Business Products.152  In Garber, the
court appeared to require the showing of either an employer policy, or
employer acquiescence, in the male supervisor's practice of compelling fe-
male employees to submit to sexual advances. 153 Since the district court's
dismissal of this claim was reversed and the case remanded for further
proceedings, the appellate court never addressed the issue of vicarious liabil-
ity.
The issue of employer liability for the actions of supervisors was explicitly
addressed in Barnes v. Costle. 154 The majority opinion stated that an em-
ployer is generally liable for violations of Title VII by its supervisory person-
nel unless the employer was unaware of discriminatory practices or, when
made aware, rectified the consequences. 155 Clearly, under this pronounce-
ment an employer is not absolved from liability merely because he promul-
gated a policy prohibiting sexual harassment. However, there seemingly
would never be a successful plaintiff if the employer, after discovering the
conduct, rectified the consequences. Judge MacKinnon's concurring opinion
offered a more constructive analysis for a finding of vicarious liability against
an employer. After a review of the common law of agency and tort, Judge
MacKinnon concluded that the employer would not be vicariously liable at
common law under the facts alleged. Judge MacKinnon reviewed employer
liability for violations of Title VII 156 and under the National Labor Relations
150. See notes 17-43 and accompanying text supra.
151. Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated, 562
F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977). Accord, Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976) (plaintiff
must allege a policy or practice of her supervisor in harassing plaintiff and other female
employees), vacated, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
152. 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977), rev'g sub nom. Garber v. Saxon Indus., Inc., 14 Empl.
Prac. Dec. 7586 (E.D. Va. 1976).
153. 552 F.2d at 1032.
154. 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'g sub nom. Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 123 (D.D.C. 1974). See notes 20-23 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of the
facts in Barnes.
155. 561 F.2d at 993.
156. Judge MacKinnon stated:
Title VII includes in its definition of employer "any agent" of one who fits the
general definition. The District Court in Tomkins v. Public Service Electric & Gas
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Act 157 and suggested three general rationales for ignoring the common law
and imposing employer liability.' 58 Judge MacKinnon found that since the
allegations of the plaintiff were sufficient to raise a suspicion that the em-
ployer either knew or should have known of the harassment, the common
law result of no employer liability was effectively reversed by the statute. 59
Co. emphasized the reference to agent in the general definition, though eventually
that court found that the sexual advances involved there were outside the purview of
the supervisor's authority:
Insofar as the quoted language suggests that acts done for the private benefit
of an individual supervisor cannot be imputed to the Employer for the
purpose of finding a violation of Title VII, this Court respectfully disagrees. If
a supervisor is acting within the purview of his authority, the doctrine of
respondeat superior may be employed whether he is driving a company car or
victimizing a female. See Title 42 United States Code, § 2000e(b) which
expressly includes any agent of an employer within the meaning of "em-
ployer."
Id. at 997 (citations omitted).
157. The reasoning of Judge MacKinnon is particularly noteworthy:
The other significant legislative scheme governing employer-employee relations,
the National Labor Relations Act, defines employer in a similar way: "The term
'employer' includes any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or
indirectly." 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970). To the extent that the term "agency" is used,
however, the usual principles of agency are invoked; and, as has been seen, those
rules would deny government liability as an employer in a case such as this. The
supervisor is not acting as an agent when he commits the tort complained of; hence,
no unlawful employment practice has been committed by the "employer."
A different interpretation has been followed, however, where the tortious conduct
is also violative of the National Labor Relations Act. While granting fullest rein to an
employer's discretion to hire, promote, or fire for a "good reason, a bad reason, or no
reason at all," that statute, as interpreted by the courts, delineates certain impermis-
sible reasons (such as discrimination for or against union members); and when those
impermissible reasons are involved, the normal rules of vicarious liability are not
applied. For example, if a supervisor singles out union members for abusive treat-
ment, neither actual nor constructive knowledge by the personnel director is re-
quired to find a section 8(a)(3) violation. The supervisor might even be acting outside
the scope of his employment and contrary to the announced policy of the employer,
still, to hold that no violation occurred "would provide a simple means for evading
the Act by a division of corporate functions." Allegheny Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v.
NLRB, 312 F.2d 529, 531 (3d Cir. 1962). This approach has even been extended so
far as to find a violation in the combination of two acts, by two different members of
management, where each was itself permissible.
Id. (footnote omitted).
158. Judge MacKinnon's reasoning was threefold. First, if ambiguous conduct might be
violative of the statute, the employer is in the best position to know the real cause, and to come
forward with an explanation. Second, the employer, not the employee, can establish prophylac-
tic rules which, without upsetting efficiency, could obviate the circumstances of potential
discrimination. Finally, the type of conduct at issue is questionable at best, and it is not
undesirable to induce careful employers to err on the side of avoiding possibly violative conduct.
Id. at 998.
159. Id. at 1000. However, Judge MacKinnon went on to emphasize that the plaintiff still has
a substantial burden to prove:
As alleged, EPA officials other than Barnes' own supervisor must be shown to have
incorrectly or falsely advised plaintiff in processing her complaint, and to have
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One of the most recent federal circuit courts to address the issue of em-
ployer liability for a supervisor's sexual harassment of subordinates was the
Ninth Circuit in Miller v. Bank of America. 0  Plaintiff Miller claimed that
she was fired shortly after she refused her supervisor's demands for sexual
favors. The district court, relying on Corne and Williams, granted summary
judgment for the employer, finding that Title VII was not intended to hold
an employer liable for isolated and unauthorized sexual misconduct between
employees.'"'
On appeal, the appellee bank conceded that the only bar to a successful
cause of action was the issue of whether it should be held responsible for its
supervisor's actions under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The employer
argued, as it had in the lower court, that it had an established policy
prohibiting the supervisor's alleged misconduct and therefore should not be
held liable. In addition, the bank contended that Miller failed to utilize the
bank's internal procedures for redressing her complaint and thus forfeited
whatever claim for relief she might otherwise have had.
The Ninth Circuit disregarded the employer policy reasoning, finding no
reason to exempt sexual harassment cases from the usual rule that an em-
ployer is liable for the torts of its employees acting in the course of their
employment.16 2  Relying on McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green6 3 and prior
case law, the Miller court also rejected the bank's argument that Miller had
failed to take advantage of internal procedure, holding that exhaustion of the
treated her adversely in job assignment, for the purpose of frustrating her Title VII
charge and punishing her for bringing it, or with that effect. If plaintiff can prove
this, she should prevail.
Id.
After reading the concurring opinion, one is uncertain as to the exact parameters of employer
liability in the District of Columbia appellate court. For example, the court in Vinson v. Taylor,
23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 37 (D.D.C. 1980), after reviewing Barnes and Miller, concluded that
notwithstanding the broad language of the opinions they should be read within the context of the
issues presented on appeal. The court announced, "it seems reasonable that an employer should
not be liable in these unusual cases of sexual harassment where notice to the employer must
depend upon the actual perpetrator and when there is nothing else to place the employer on
notice," and found that the employer was not vicariously liable. Id. at 42. Such a position seems
questionable under Barnes and clearly inconsistent with the EEOC guidelines at 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11(c) (1981).
More recently, in Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981), the appellate court again
failed to resolve the confusion. In concluding that the employer would be liable for the supervi-
sor's harassment, the court stated generally that an employer is liable for discriminatory acts
committed by supervisory personnel. Id. at 943. The court then noted that this case also satisfied
the more stringent test of employer respondeat superior liability advocated by Judge MacKinnon
in his concurrence in Barnes. Id. at 943 n.8. Perhaps most noteworthy is the court's failure to cite
the EEOC Guidelines with respect to employer responsibility; later in its opinion the court relies
on the Guidelines rather extensively with respect to other issues.
160. 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979).
161. 418 F. Supp. at 236.
162. 600 F.2d at 213.
163. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). In McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court outlined the scheme for
allocating the burden of proof in a case involving disparate treatment on the basis of race. The
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personnel complaint procedure is not a precondition to a Title VII suit. 6 4
The Ninth Circuit clearly adopted a strict standard of employer liability for
sexual harassment by supervisors while leaving the issue of employer liability
for nonsupervisory harassment unanswered.
The EEOC has adopted the Miller strict standard of liability for supervi-
sory sexual harassment. Section 1604. 11(c) of the Guidelines provides that an
employer "is responsible for its acts and those of its agents and supervisory
employees with respect to sexual harassment regardless of whether the spe-
cific acts complained of were authorized or even forbidden by the employer
and regardless of whether the employer knew or should have known of their
occurrence."' 6 5  The EEOC acknowledged that it received a number of
critical comments regarding the adoption of this strict standard of liability,
but reaffirmed its position when it issued the Guidelines in their final
form. 166
Court stated that the complainant in a Title VII case must carry the initial burden of establishing
a prima facie case. The Court further stated that this may be done by showing:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a
job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifica-
tions, he was rejected and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open
and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifi-
cations.
Id. at 802.
After plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the employer is required to "articulate a legiti-
mate non-discriminatory reason" for its action. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S.
567, 578 (1978). In Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978), the
Supreme Court held, consistent with Furnco and McDonnell Douglas, that to rebut a prima
facie case it is sufficient for the employer to articulate some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason
for the employee's rejection. The employer is not required to prove absence of discrmination. Id.
at 25. As stated by the District of Columbia Circuit, "[t]he employer's burden to articulate a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for this action is simply the burden of going forward with
the evidence." Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (citing Board of Trustees of
Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978)). Finally, after respondent presents a non-
discriminatory reason for the conduct alleged to violate the statute, the claimant could challenge
it on grounds that the reason given was a mere pretext for discrimination. 438 U.S. at 578.
While the McDonnell Douglas format fails to fit the sexual harassment cases, the District of
Columbia Circuit has recognized that the principles are still applicable. In Bundy, that court
held:
[T]he McDonnell formula presumes the standard situation where the alleged
discrimination is due to the bare fact of the claimant's membership in a disadvan-
taged group. It therefore also fails to fit with precision the very unusual, perhaps
unique, situation of sexual harassment, where the alleged basis of discrimination is
not the employee's gender per se, but her refusal to submit to sexual advances which
she suffered in large part because of her gender. McDonnell itself, however, recog-
nizes very realistically that the courts must adjust the definition of a prima facie case
and the allocation of burden of proof to the differing situations that may arise in
Title VII cases.
641 F.2d at 951.
164. 600 F.2d at 214.
165. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1981).
166. 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676 (1980).
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In summary, the extent of an employer's responsibility for acts of sexual
harassment committed by its supervisors is unclear. Although the EEOC has
expressly adopted a strict standard, the appellate courts appear unsettled,
and what deference the courts will give to the newly promulgated guidelines
remains to be seen." 7 Clearly, a strict standard of liability has more appeal
than the standard adopted by the District of Columbia Circuit in Barnes. As
noted by Judge MacKinnon in his concurring opinion in Barnes, Title VII
includes in its definition of "employer" any agent of one who otherwise
qualifies as a defendant.'"" Accordingly, there should be little difficulty
attributing the conduct of a supervisor acting within the purview of his or
her authority to his or her employer.
Employer Liability for Acts of Nonsupervisory Employees
Unlike supervisory harassment, an aggrieved employee does not have a
cause of action under Title VII against a co-employee for alleged sexual
harassment. The reason, of course, is that an individual employee is not a
"respondent" under Title VII. 69  As previously discussed, however, the
aggrieved employee may allege employer liability for an offensive work
environment. 170
The EEOC seems to have adopted the more traditional agency analysis of
employer liability in cases involving co-employee sexual harassment. Section
1604(d) of the Guidelines provides: "With respect to conduct between fellow
employees, an employer is responsible for acts of sexual harassment in the
workplace where the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees)
knows or should have known of the conduct, unless it can show that it took
immediate and appropriate corrective action."' 7  Although the EEOC
167. It is noteworthy that the courts, particularly the Supreme Court, have not always agreed
with the EEOC's interpretations. For example, the Supreme Court, in Albermarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), stated that the EEOC's regulations are entitled to "great defer-
ence." Id. at 431 (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971)). However, in
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), the regulations were accorded mere "consid-
eration." The Court stated that the "weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend
upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency
with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which gave it power to persuade, if
lacking in the power to control." Id. at 141-42 (citing Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 140
(1944)). Finally, in Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977), the Court stated that:
Ordinarily an EEOC guideline is not entitled to great weight where, as here, it
varies from prior EEOC policy and no new legislative history has been introduced in
support of the change. . . . But where "Congress has not just kept its silence by
refusing to overturn the administrative construction, but has ratified it with positive
legislation" ... the guideline is entitled to some deference.
Id. at 76 n.ll.
168. See note 152 supra.
169. An aggrieved employee, however, may assert a cause of action under one of several
common law doctrines such as assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, or
breach of contract. See Note, Legal Remedies for Employment-Related Sexual Harassment, 64
MINN. L. Rxv. 151, 167-68 (1979).
170. See notes 109-39 and accompanying text supra.
171. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (1981).
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guideline is consistent with traditional agency analysis, no appellate court
has addressed this issue to date. Furthermore, the decisions that have upheld
employer liability under the hostile work environment theory all involved
persistent and clearly egregious harassment by co-employees. 7 2
Employer Liability for Acts of Nonemployees
Although no cases involving sexual harassment by nonemployees were
found, the EEOC has provided at section 1604.11(e) of the Guidelines that:
An employer may also be responsible for the acts of non-employees, with
respect to sexual harassment of employees in the workplace, where the
employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have
known of the conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate correc-
tive action. In reviewing these cases the Commission will consider the
extent of the employer's control and any other legal responsibility which
the employer may have with respect to the conduct of such non-employ-
ees. 173
This standard of liability appears merely to restate the traditional agency
analysis of acquiescence and ratification, a standard under which employers
have long been held accountable. 74 That the EEOC has made an express
provision for such liability forecasts the vigor with which the EEOC will
enforce its Guidelines to combat sexual harassment.
AvoIDING LIABILITY FOR ACTS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
It is clear that remedies are available under Title VII for discriminatory
conduct that manifests itself as sexual harassment. As illustrated by the
previous discussion, the plaintiff need only prove that the conduct was
sexually harassing in an employment context, that the harassment was dis-
criminatorily imposed, that acquiescence in the harassment was made a term
or condition of employment, and that the harassment was attributable to the
employer. Further, to illustrate the extent to which courts are willing to
recognize Title VII claims based on sexual harassment, plaintiffs have recov-
ered for sexual harassment that exists due to a hostile working environment.
Thus, plaintiff's burden of proving that the harassment was a term or condi-
tion of employment is lessened.
It is readily apparent that the courts are willing to recognize Title VII
claims based on sexual harassment in a variety of contexts. This increasing
judicial acceptance of the cause of action, coupled with the EEOC's stance as
evidenced in the recently issued Guidelines, promises to make the sexual
172. See, e.g., Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 996-97 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (MacKinnon, J.,
concurring).
173. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (1981).
174. See, e.g., NLRB v. Cherokee Hosiery Mills, 196 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1952) (discussion of
an employer's responsibility under the NLRA for anti-union conduct of a nonemployee).
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harassment form of discrimination a fertile source of Title VII litigation in
the future. Therefore, any employer would be wise to consider new measures
to insulate themselves from frequent claims and potential liability.
Given the current status of the law, there are a number of options avail-
able to the employer to minimize the probability that he or she will end up
on the wrong side of a successful Title VII suit. One theoretical, but imprac-
tical, option is to exempt oneself from coverage of the statute by having
fewer than fifteen employees during twenty or more calendar weeks. It
should be stressed, however, that even if this option were feasible, state and
even local legislation may effectively place such an employer under some
type of fair employment coverage. 175
Another equally impractical option to shield oneself from a Title VII
infraction is to employ only asexual or bisexual employees. ' 6 The result will
be no sexual harassment, or, in the alternative, equal harassment of all
employees regardless of sex. It should be recalled that Title VII does not
prohibit all forms of irrational or invidious behavior, but only discrimination
in employment based on race, color, religion, gender, or national origin.
Since the statute only addresses the discriminatory application of gender-
based criteria not otherwise sanctioned by the BFOQ or business necessity
175. Of particular note is the Policy on Sexual Harassment of the District of Columbia, as
issued by Mayor's Order 79-89 (May 24, 1979), providing in part:
Sexual harassment shall be deemed to be a form of sexual discrimination which is
prohibited under District laws and regulations, including this Order.
Sexual harassment is defined as the exercise or attempt to exercise by a person of
the authority and power of his or her position to control, influence or affect the
career, salary, or job of another employee or prospective employee in exchange for
sexual favors. Sexual harassment may include, but is not limited to:
(1) verbal harassment or abuse;
(2) subtle pressure for sexual activity;
(3) unnecessary patting or pinching;
(4) constant brushing against another employee's body;
(5) demanding sexual favors accompanied by overt threat concerning an individ-
ual's employment status;
(6) demanding sexual favors accompanied by implied or overt promise of prefer-
ential treatment with regard to an individual's employment status.
Id.
176. As stated by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia: "Only by a reductio ad
absurdum could we imagine a case of harassment that is not sex discrimination-where a
bisexual supervisor harasses men and women alike." Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 938 n.7
(D.C. Cir. 1981).
Although numerous courts have upheld a female employee's claim based on her termination
for having refused sexual advances from a male supervisor, Wright v. Methodist Youth Services,
25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 563 (N.D. I11. 1981), considered an alleged sexual demand made of a
male employee that would not have been directed at a female. In Wright, the District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois held that a male employee's claim that he was terminated
because he refused the homosexual advances of a male supervisor stated a cause of action under
Title VII, at least in the situation where the same demands would not have been made on female
employees.
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exception, employees of both genders that are subject to equal harassment
will not have a cause of action under the Act.177
Fortunately, there are less ludicrous alternatives available. An employer
may simply attempt to prohibit all "social fraternization" between employ-
ees within a particular working unit.17  Such a rule, when supported by the
threat of disciplinary action, may be effective in alerting employees that it
does not pay even to attempt a sexual advance.
Absent a total ban on social interactions among all employees within a
unit, there is much to be said concerning the establishment of a rule prohibit-
ing all office romances between supervisors and subordinates. An employee
177. There is, however, some authority to the contrary. For example, in Bundy v. Jackson,
641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981), the court stated that "discrimination is sex discrimination
whenever sex is for no legitimate reason a substantial factor in the discrimination." Also, in
Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977), that same court of appeals declared:
It is no answer to say that a similar condition could be imposed on a male subordi-
nate by a heterosexual female superior, or upon a subordinate of either gender by a
homosexual superior of the same gender. In each instance the legal problem would
be identical to that confronting us now-the exaction of a condition which, but for
his or her sex, the employee would not have faced.
Id. at 990 n.55.
To the extent that the courts adopt a "but for" theory of sex discrimination, i.e., but for a
person's sex, he or she would not be subject to harassment of a sexual nature, all forms of sexual
harassment would be prohibited by the statute regardless of whether the conduct was discrimi-
natorily applied. Such a reading, while not unreasonable, is arguably at odds with the language
of the statute.
178. Romantic relationships between males and females of the same organization were ex-
plored in a recent study by Robert E. Quinn. Quinn, Coping with Cupid: The Formation,
Impact, and Management of Romantic Relationships in Organizations, 22 AD. Sci. Q. 30 (1977).
Using third-party reports, Quinn analyzed some 130 cases of men and women coworkers who
became romantically involved. According to Quinn:
A little more than 10 percent of the cases are characterized by such positive results
as increased coordination, lower tensions, improved teamwork, improved productiv-
ity, and improved work flow ....
Negative results vary in intensity. About one-third of the cases are characterized
by only increased gossip and perceptions of favoritism. A third, however, are charac-
terized by serious negative features, the most frequent being complaints, hostilities,
and distorted communications. These are followed by the perception that the image
or reputation of the unit is being jeopardized, there is slower decision making, a
redistribution of work, client or customer awareness, lower morale, lower produc-
tivity, and someone loses a job.
Id. at 42.
Quinn also reports that managerial response is varied. "Once supervisors know about a
romantic relationship, they may do three things: take no action at all, take punitive action, or
take positive action." Id. at 43. Finally, Quinn reports that the effects of an office romance may
not be equally distributed.
The female is twice as likely to be terminated as is the male. Because the male is
usually in a higher position, he apparently is seen as less dispensable than the female.
The female is also thought to be much less likely to benefit from an open discussion
or from counseling by superiors. The latter two conditions, however, are mediated
by the fact that the female's superior is often the other participant in the relation-
ship.
Id. at 44.
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who voluntarily enters into such a social relationship with a superior may
command an unfair advantage with respect to job evaluations, merit in-
creases, and promotions.7 9 In this respect, the EEOC Guidelines indicate
that employees who were not afforded this "opportunity" may have a cause
of action under the statute. As stated by the EEOC, "[wihere employment
opportunities or benefits are granted because of an individual's submission to
the employer's requests for sexual favors, the employer may be held liable for
unlawful sex discrimination against other .persons who were qualified but
denied that employment opportunity."'180  In Williams v. Civiletti,'8' a
somewhat different twist to a sexual harassment claim was considered, albeit
in dictum, by the District Court for the District of Columbia. In Williams,
the court considered an employee's claim that she was fired because she had
a vendetta against her immediate supervisor after he had jilted her. The
Williams court stated that if a supervisor chooses to accept the sexual favors
of a subordinate employee and such a relationship sours, resulting in the
deterioration of their working relationship, no sanctions against the em-
ployee can be taken without disclosure of the employment-relation problem
with the actual authority making the decision. 82  To rule otherwise, ob-
served the court, would create an opportunity for excessive abuse. A supervi-
sor would be able to take advantage of his position and remove his former
lovers on the ground that a personality conflict had developed.8 3 The court
reasoned that a requirement of full disclosure to the proper managerial
authorities would chill the willingness of supervisors to engage in such activ-
ity. 8 4
An employer should also make it clear that sexual harassment is a prohib-
ited employment practice that will not be tolerated at the workplace.8 5
179. As argued by one commentator:
Where a sexually cooperative woman not only acquired parity with males but
garnered an extraordinary employment advantage, males should be able to maintain
an action for being denied the opportunity to make similar progress. Even if the
target of the sexual advance were to decline the opportunity, males might still
maintain their action, since they would have been denied the extraordinary employ-
ment opportunity offered the woman.
Note, Sexual Harassment and Title VII: The Foundation Jor the Elimination oJ Sexual Coopera-
tion as an Employment Condition, 76 MICH. L. REv. 1007, 1032 (1978).
180. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(g) (1981).
181. 487 F. Supp. 1387 (D.D.C. 1980).
182. Id. at 1389.
183. id.
184. Id.
185. At the federal level, the United States Office of Personnel Management has issued a
policy statement requiring that all federal agencies conform to the following mandate with
respect to sexual harassment:
1. Issue a very strong management statement clearly defining the policy of the
federal government as the employer with regard to sexual harassment;
2. Emphasize this policy as part of a new employee organization covering the
merit principles and the code of conduct; and
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One method of communicating this to employees is through posting notices
that sexual harassment is a form of prohibited sex discrimination under Title
VII. A simple statement that the courts have declared that racial, ethnic,
religious, or sexual harassment at the workplace is prohibited by Title VII
should suffice. Another method of putting employees on notice is simply to
incorporate Title VII's proscription against sexual harassment into existing
plant rules. Thus, employees found to have been involved in sexual harass-
ment will be subject to disciplinary sanctions. 8 6 An employer may also
provide notice in a plant or organization newsletter.187
One method of putting employees on notice that sexual harassment will
not be tolerated, and, at the same time, providing a mechanism for alleviat-
ing claims of harassment, is to institute a separate grievance procedure.' 8
3. Make employees aware of the avenues for seeking redress, and the actions that
will be taken against employees violating the policy.
See U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Memorandum to Heads of Departments and Inde-
pendent Agencies, Subject: Policy Statement and Definition of Sexual Harassment, Washington,
D.C., (Dec. 12, 1979).
186. As a remedy for the improper sexually harassing environment maintained by the em-
ployer in Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981), the court issued the following order,
quoted in part:
Defendant is further required:
1. To notify all employees and supervisors in the Department, through individual
letters and permanent posting in prominent locations throughout the Department
offices, that sexual harassment, as explicitly defined in the previous paragraph,
violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, regulatory guidelines of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, the express orders of the Mayor of the
District of Columbia, and the policy of the Department of Corrections.
2. To ensure that employees complaining of sexual harassment can avail them-
selves of the full and effective use of the complaint, hearing, adjudication, and
appeals procedures for complaints of discrimination established by the Department
of Corrections pursuant to Civil Service Regulations....
3. To develop appropriate sanctions or disciplinary measures for supervisors or
other employees who are found to have sexually harassed female employees, includ-
ing warnings to the offending person and notations in that person's employment
record for reference in the event future complaints are directed against that person.
4. To develop other appropriate means of instructing employees of the Depart-
ment of the harmful nature of sexual harassment.
Id. at 948 n.15.
187. This approach is illustrated by a recent notice in the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development's March, 1980 newsletter which provides in relevant part:
Employees who are subjected to sexual harassment by other HUD employees on the
job may consider taking the following actions where appropriate: File a grievance
under the Department's grievance system or a union contract grievance procedure;
Notify the Office of Inspector General by calling the HUD Employee Hotline; File a
formal complaint of discrimination; and Contact any of HUD's Federal Women's
Program or EEOC Coordinators.
Department of Housing and Urban Development, HUDDLE (March, 1980) (inter-departmental
newsletter). See also NEUGARTEN & SHAFMTZ, supra note 1, at 8.
188. One procedure implemented by an employer and a labor organization is as follows:
1. If the complaint involves alleged advances and/or other harassment by a
Supervisor, the complaint should be filed by the Employee with the Personnel
Manager.
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2. If the complaint involves alleged advances and/or other harassment by a fellow
Employee, the complaint should be filed with the Complainant's Supervisor, who
will then refer it to the Personnel Manager.
3. In either of the above, the complaint should be made in writing and contain
but not [be] limited to the following: date, time, and location of incident, name of
individual involved, witnesses, if any, and a detailed description of the alleged
harassment.
A second procedure, suggested by Mary Faucher and Kenneth McCulloch, provides a separate
grievance format for filing, investigating and resolving a sexual harassment case:
Possible Procedure for Processing Complaints:
1. Post notice of policy (including prohibitions of harassment by ANY employees)
2. Complaint made to proper department/party
made to supervisory personnel and referred
to proper department/party
Re: advances/harassment Re: advances/harrasment
by supervisors I by co-workers (based on
racial-epithet cases)
3. Investigation
a. Interview with complainant
b. Interview with accused
c. Check of personnel files
i. Evidence of prior friction between parties
ii. Previous complaints
iii. Work records I
d. Interviews with witnesses/possible witnesses
4. Action to be taken
a. No foundation other than complaint/
No record in accused's/ Reiteration of policy
file; no dissemination against harassment;
of charge general announcement
b. Some foundation/
Warning/notation in file Warning/disciplinary slip
-Warning coupled with automatic suspension upon
second complaint
-Reprimand coupled with automatic suspension upon
second complaint
-Reprimand/threat of suspension
c. Sold foundation for charge
-Demotion
-Suspension
-Dismissal
-Restoration of work record of complaining employee
Faucher & McCulloch, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace- What Should the Employer Do?
5 EEO TODAY 38, 38-46 (1978), reprinted in NEUGARTEN & SHAFRMTZ, supra note 1, at 91.
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The utility of enacting a separate grievance procedure cannot be under-
stated. Although courts have made it clear that exhaustion of internal reme-
dies is not a prerequisite to suit under Title VII, a failure on the part of a
complaining employee to pursue the available internal avenues of redress
does render tenuous a finding of employer culpability.'89
Separate training programs also may prove useful. The Wall Street Jour-
nal reported in a recent article 190 that supervisors at General Motors were
enrolled in an awareness course for dealing with sexual harassment. Topics
covered included how to refer complaints and when not to interfere. More-
over, to advise subordinates, supervisors were given the benchmark question:
"Would you be embarrassed to see your remarks or behavior in the newspa-
per or described by your own family?" It was further reported that rank-
and-file employees learned of the policy against sexual harassment from
bulletin board notices which included the name of a plant personnel staff
member who would confidentially investigate complaints. The same article
also noted that the Chicago Transit Authority enclosed reminders in pay
envelopes informing employees that sexual harassment is illegal and that
employees had a right to complain.
Of most importance is that an employer police the work environment.
Cases frequently mention that a Title VII violation occurs whenever the
employer should have known that employees were being subjected to acts of
sexual harassment. As stated by the Tomkins court, Title VII is violated
when a supervisor conditions some aspect of an employee's job status on
compliance with sexual demands and the employer fails to take remedial
action despite his having actual or constructive knowledge."9 ' Another court
has likewise explained: "If employers have reason to believe that sexual
demands are being made on employees they are obligated under Title VII to
investigate the matter and correct any violations of the law.' 92
When instances of sexual harassment are discovered, an employer should
not hesitate to discipline an offending employee.' 93 As noted above, an
189. See Miller v. Bank of Am., 418 F. Supp. 233, 236 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd, 600 F.2d
211 (9th Cir. 1979).
190. Lublin, Resisting Advances, Wall St. J., Apr. 24, 1981, at 1, col. 1. Lublin also reports
that numerous corporations, colleges, hospitals, unions and government agencies are enacting
policies, initiating training programs, strengthening grievance procedures, and reprimanding or
firing known harassers in an attempt to mitigate the problem and protect themselves against
lawsuits. Major employers include: General Electric Co., Bank of America, Ashland Oil, Inc.,
International Business Machines Corp., and the cities of Philadelphia, Los Angeles, and New
York, as well as numerous state and federal agencies. Id.
191. Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1048-49 (3rd Cir. 1977).
192. Heelan v. Johns-Manville Corp., 451 F.Supp. 1382, 1391 (D. Colo. 1978). See also
Fisher v. Flynn, 598 F.2d 663, 665-66 n.4 (1st Cir. 1979).
193. In Snipes v. U.S. Postal Service, 677 F.2d 375 (4th Cir. 1982), the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit affirmed a Merit Protection Board decision upholding the discharge of a
supervisor who sexually harassed female employees, even when the offense was his first in a long
career with the government. According to the Fourth Circuit, "the counterpart of insubordina-
tion, abuse of supervisory authority, is in its way just as inimical to the efficiency of the service.
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employer that fails to respond to a valid complaint will, in all likelihood, be
found to have violated the statute regardless of whether the employer had
prior knowledge that employees were subjected to sexually harassing con-
duct. While any discipline imposed under such a grievance procedure may
be challenged by the employee disciplined,19 4 that the employer took some
action arguably will be evidence of the employer's efforts to police the
workplace and to comply with the statute. In the words of the District of
Columbia Circuit, "should a supervisor contravene employer policy without
the employer's knowledge and the consequence [be] rectified when discov-
ered, the employer may be relieved from responsibility under Title VII."s 5
At least with respect to acts of sexual harassment committed by nonsupervi-
sors, the EEOC Guidelines clearly provide that "an employer may rebut
apparent liability for such acts by showing that it took immediate and
appropriate corrective action."'96
An example dealing with racial harassment where the employer's response
was deemed sufficient to escape liability under Title VII is Howard v.
National Cash Register Co.19 7  In response to complaints of racial harass-
Consequently, the proof of abuse of supervisory authority satisfies on its face the provision of (5
USC) 7513(a) that discharge is permissible only when it will promote the efficiency of the
service." Id. at 378.
194. See Marmo, Arbitrating Sex Harassment Cases, 35 AaB. J. 35, 39(1980).
In Charles Champion and University of Missouri Health Sciences Center, Columbia, Missouri,
78 L.A. 417 (1982), Arbitrator Sol Yarowsky upheld the discharge of a supervisor upon finding
that the supervisor engaged in sexual-type discussions and physical contact with female house-
keeper subordinates. Arbitrator Yarowsky found that the complainants perceived the supervisor's
conduct as substantially interfering with their work performance by creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive working environment, regardless of whether their response was tolerance or
resistance.
Yarowsky declared that the supervisor engaged in subtle, not explicit, sexual harassment by
putting his arm around one woman's waist; looking, smacking his lips, and commenting about
the attractiveness of another; speaking of sex and virginity and touching another; touching and
brushing the hair and uniform of another; and casting penetrating looks at another so that she
imagined herself "undressed." "This is actually a 'course of conduct' and may not be gainsaid by
replying that grievant was merely friendly or brotherly or merely considerate to his female
subordinates," Yarowsky declared, calling this classic, limit-testing behavior, even though the
grievant did not perceive this activity to be inappropriate.
Yarowsky further noted that even though the university had no announced policy on sexual
harassment at the time of grievant's dismissal, supervisors need no explicit rules of conduct to
constitute notice of what male-female activity is considered proper. Specific training as to what
specifics of sexual harassment were objectionable would have been redundant, according to the
arbitrator, so the grievant may not now rely on this gap even though the university adopted an
explicit sexual harassment policy after his dismissal.
195. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
As noted earlier, see notes 137-66 and accompanying text supra, the EEOC is arguably at odds
with the proposition expressed by the appellate court in Barnes. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c)
(1981), which states that "an employer ... is responsible for its acts and those of its agents and
supervisory employees with respect to sexual harassment regardless of whether. . .the employer
knew or should have known of their occurrence."
196. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (1981).
197. 388 F. Supp. 603 (S.D. Ohio 1975).
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ment by an employee, the employer escaped liability under the Act when it
transferred the employee to another shift, held frequent meetings with the
complaining employee and the head of his department, disseminated the
company's anti-harassment policy to all employees, and took disciplinary
action against the harassers. Again, an employer that discovers sexually
harassing conduct should be mindful that courts have found relevant the
employer's attempts upon notification to alleviate the consequences of har-
assing acts.
CONCLUSION
One rationale expressed in the early decisions for denying acts of sexual
harassment was the effect that recognizing such a cause of action would have
on the court system. Courts feared that if claims of sexual harassment were
cognizable under the statute, the judicial system would find itself embroiled
in the resolution of personal vendettas between supervisors and employees.
As correctly stated by the District of Columbia Circuit, this contention is
misplaced for it cannot be assumed that Congress did not realize that prob-
lems also inhered in claims of employment discrimination stemming from
race, color, religion, or national origin. 98 In designating gender as one of
the impermissible criteria, Congress made a decision that courts are not free
to disturb. In this respect it is not beyond serious dispute that Title VII
provides a cause of action for sexually harassing conduct. The EEOC, in its
recently formulated Guidelines, has announced that verbal or physical con-
duct of a sexual nature constitutes sexual harassment when (1) submission to
such conduct is made an implicit or explicit condition of employment, (2)
submission or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis
for employment decisions affecting an individual, or (3) where such conduct
has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's
work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment.199 Moreover, a review of court decisions indicates that to
successfully state a claim under the statute, the plaintiff must plead and
prove that the conduct is sexual in nature, is discriminatorily applied within
an employment context, and is in some way attributable to the employer.
Recent decisions have also made it clear that Title VII may provide relief
where an employer created or condoned an unreasonably discriminatory
work environment, regardless of whether an employee loses any tangible job
benefit as a result of the discrimination.2 0 0 Accordingly, while not dead,
love in the office is now clearly subject to close scrutiny by both the courts
and the EEOC and employers should take action to guard against liability.
198. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 994 n.81 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
199. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1981).
200. Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir, 1981).
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